As referenced by the Selected Bibliography found in Why Germany Nearly Won: A New History of the Second World War in Europe the following represents a complete listing of primary and secondary sources used in researching Why Germany Nearly Won.
This method of presenting the bibliographic information found in Why Germany Nearly Won was chosen by the author for two reasons. One, as a result of the space limitations imposed by the publisher.
Conventional wisdom explains German defeat during World War II as almost inevitable primarily for brute-force economic or military reasons created when Germany attacked the Soviet Union and entered into a two-front war. This book challenges that conventional wisdom via three interrelated arguments. First, qualitative differences between the combatants proved more important in determining the war’s outcome than have the quantitative measures so commonly discussed in the past.
Why Germany Nearly Won challenges today's conventional wisdom explaining Germany's Second World War defeat as inevitable primarily for brute force economic or military reasons created when Germany attacked the Soviet Union. Taking an entirely new perspective on explaining the Second World War in Europe, and its outcome, at its core Why Germany Nearly Won offers the reader three interrelated, unique, and potentially ground-breaking arguments.
