SStalin'sIntentionsJune1941PageTwo

The Conventional Wisdom:

By the night of June 21, 1941, well over half the 1941 German army or 3.2 million German
soldiers in 4 Panzergruppen and 7 infantry armies, comprising 151 divisions, were massed
on the Soviet borders as members of the most lethal invasion force in European history.[2]
These armies included 19 panzer and 12 motorized divisions, 3,208 tanks, 250 assault
guns, and 7,184 artillery pieces. To move and supply this incredible mass of men and
machines the German army had gathered over 600,000 vehicles and 600,000 horses.[3]
Although an even more massive Soviet army confronted the Germans, both Hitler and his
generals stood at the height of National Socialist arrogance, having easily defeated the
powerful French army the previous year. Hitler had even grandiosely code-named the
German campaign Barbarossa; after German Emperor Fredrick I Barbarossa, and his First
Reich. Barbarossa had led German knights in a series of crusades against the Muslim armies
beginning around the year 1189. Hitler evidently had sought to evoke the same spirit of
ideologically charged grand adventure by granting the name Barbarossa to the campaign
propelling the millions of Axis officers and men pouring across the Soviet borders on June
22, 1941.

Within days of crossing the borders, the German led armies produced stunning successes
as they gobbled up real estate and crushed Soviet resistance. In the War's first two weeks
alone, the Red Army endured staggering manpower losses; at the rate of 44,000 men per
day. By October 1st the Red Army's total losses had reached an astounding 2.8 million
men,[4] and by the end of the year this total would climb to well over 4 million permanent
losses. As if the losses to the Red Army were not enough, by the end of November the
Soviet Union had lost 47% of its agricultural land, 41% of its railroad network, 62.5% of
Soviet pre-war coal output, 68% of Soviet pre-war steel output, 60% of aluminum
output,[5] and 40% of the Soviet Union's labor force.[6] The first months of the War could
hardly have gone worse for the Soviet Union.

Never before in modern history did a nation suffer such massive defeats in such a short
period as did the Soviet Union in the summer and fall of 1941.[7] Ironically, the Soviet
Union suffered this succession of catastrophic defeats in spite of the fact accurate and
abundant intelligence regarding Hitler's plans for war had reached Stalin with an astonishing
regularity in the months, weeks and days leading up to the German invasion. In no
inconsiderable measure then, Stalin had played a central role in perhaps the greatest
military disaster in modern history. Stalin seemed to somewhat recognize his culpability in
the disaster, after the invasion began and the depth of the Red Army's defeats became
obvious Stalin bitterly commented "Lenin founded our state…and we've fucked it up."[8]

Stalin's mistakes would cost the Soviet Union dearly in the long run as well; according to
some the seeds of the Soviet Union's 1991 collapse stemmed from the impact produced by
the German invasion; an invasion from which the Soviet Union never truly recovered.[9]
Nevertheless, the grim situation the Soviet Union faced in November 1941 need not have
been reality had the accurate intelligence reports streaming into Stalin's office been acted
upon by Stalin and his senior leadership. The scale of the disaster Hitler's army inflicted
upon the Soviet Union during 1941 has therefore driven the ensuing debate into what
Stalin was thinking when he chose to ignore what his best intelligence assets were telling
him in the spring of 1941.

The conventional wisdom built up over the years to explain Stalin's thought process is
simple; Stalin feared involvement in the larger war, espcially war with Germany, to such an
extant he ignored clear provocations and warning signs. Stalin then handcuffed his military
leadership in their attempts to prepare for war by ordering war readiness measures so
glacial as to be nearly useless in the short term.

Although it is one thing to comment more than sixty years after the fact that Germany was
clearly barreling toward war with the Soviet Union the question remains; how clear were
the warning signs and German provocations? It is simple to say in hindsight that it was
obvious the Germans had the Soviet Union in their sights, but was it apparent at the time.
To determine the answer to this question we need to look at the information Stalin could
access during the spring of 1941 and judge whether this information should have caused
Stalin to react with far more alacrity than he showed in the months leading up to the
German invasion.

The conventional wisdom cites to a tremendous body of evidence in proving Stalin willfully
procrastinated as Germany planned its attack. Moreover, the conventional wisdom shows
Stalin's refusal to acknowledge the imminence of the looming threat on the Soviet western
borders represented a catastrophic failure of leadership. The leadership void at the top left
Stalin's subordinates in the position of facing a likely German invasion but forced to; a.)
Bury their thoughts for fear Stalin would have them killed; b.) Bravely presenting what they
knew to Stalin and face being killed for their temerity; or c.) Taking half-measures that
attempted to meet Stalin's convoluted orders and risk Stalin's wrath if these measures
failed. No other group of high-ranking military officers and political leaders from any other
combatant during the War faced such an appallingly horrific work environment as did the
men running the Soviet Union under Stalin's lethally paranoid and watchful eye. Thus,
Stalin held a unique position in the run up to the disaster suffered by the Soviet Union in
1941.

For instance, the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin, hamstrung by Stalin's orders not to provoke
the Germans, but having recognized the Germans had willfully and regularly violated Soviet
sovereignty in the spring of 1941, only belatedly filed a complaint with the State Secretary
to the German Foreign Office. The Soviet Ambassador to Berlin filed his complaint on June
21, 1941, regarding Germany's 260 breaches of Soviet airspace; all documented by the
Soviet border patrol in the months leading up to Barbarossa and until June 21st not even
remotely challenged.[10]

To put Stalin's willful disregard of his own nation's sovereignty in perspective, during the
War Swedish military aircraft actually exchanged fire with German forces when challenged
by the Germans during Swedish reconnaissance gathering operations in the Baltic. The
exchange of fire between Sweden and Germany occurred in spite of the fact Sweden was
ostensibly neutral; as well as one of Germany's most important and active trading partners
throughout the War.[11] Stalin could have easily responded to shut down German
reconnaissance gathering operations within and above Soviet territory, but he did not.
Perhaps the Soviet Union's extensive spy services were reporting information very different
from the readily observable fact German reconnaissance aircraft regularly plied the skies
over the Soviet Union.

In actuality, warnings regarding the imminent German attack from the Soviet Union's
superb human intelligence assets had reached Stalin up until the final days prior to open
war, adding further credence to the ominous cause behind German reconnaissance aircraft
repeatedly violating Soviet airspace. Although abundant examples exist documenting the
considerable intelligence Soviet intelligence agencies had uncovered, I will briefly mention
three different types of intelligence sources as emblematic of the source and quality of
incoming information Stalin was privy.

First, came the fruits provided from the work of the Soviet Union's superb human
intelligence assets. Soviet Spy Richard Sorge, stationed at the German embassy in Tokyo,
supplied Stalin with accurate and valuable intelligence as to what exactly Hitler had
planned. Sorge informed Stalin as to Barbarossa's approximate goals, timing, and even the
German forces disposition.[12] Stalin put down Sorge's information as the product of "a
little shit" and not worth his attention.[13] A second well placed source came from within
Berlin, where the Soviet spy Rudolf Roessler, a well-connected private citizen with
high-ranking friends in the Wermacht, provided equally accurate information to Stalin;
again regarding the German order of battle and preparations for war in Eastern
Europe.[13a] Finally, in April 1941, a Czech agent also accurately predicted the Germans
would attack in June.[13b]

A second type of information regarding German intentions also reached Stalin in the spring
of 1941. Various Foreign Diplomats regularly provided further confirmation as to aggressive
German intentions; backing the reports from Soviet sympathizers and spies. Four examples
are sufficient to illustrate what these diplomats revealed to Stalin. First, during the spring,
the Yugoslav ambassador to Moscow had provided information to the Soviets showing the
Germans were massing for an assault on the Soviet Union. Second, British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill also had chimed in regularly, updating Moscow on German preparations
for Barbarossa.[13c] Third, on both March 20 and April 15, 1941 the Americans warned
Soviet diplomats the Germans were massing men and equipment on Soviet borders. Even
Chiang Kai-Shek in China warned the Germans would likely attack on June 21st.[14]

The stream of reports flowing to Stalin from foreign sources, Soviet intelligence gathering
assets and communist sympathizers represented only the beginning in what became the
largest intelligence war in history. At its peak, 40,000 German intelligence agents and
security service personnel fought and competed against 150,000 Soviet intelligence and
counter-intelligence personnel across Eastern Europe and the globe.[15] The world had
never and since has not seen anything like it. The Cold War skirmishes between the
American led security services and Soviet security services paled in comparison to this
intelligence war. Regardless of what it became though, the burgeoning intelligence war
between the Soviet Union and National Socialist Germany was, in the spring of 1941, one
Stalin seemed dead set on losing even before it had fully begun.

In addition to the more covert resources describing German intentions previously mentioned
there was another more pedestrian source providing Stalin with ample cause for alarm.
Stalin had access to a source readily available to all; in part because the Germans were
only engaging in rudimentary attempts to conceal what they were doing. Had Stalin merely
staid abreast of the international news he needn't have even read the reports from his
prolific security services, the Red Army Air Force's observations of German reconnaissance
aircraft within Soviet airspace or the tips from foreign diplomats and he still would have
had reason to know Germany had prepared to invade the Soviet Union.

For instance, as early as Thursday June 12, 1941; or over one week prior to the German
invasion, the Times of London reported "In Romania three fresh Army Corps arrived about
the beginning of this month to join others on the Bessarabian frontier. All the roads from
Bucharest to the frontier are reported to be filled with military transports. The road, 90
miles long, from Sibiu to Bragy is bordered with many German military camps. Altogether,
from the Baltic to the Black Sea, about 100 German divisions are now standing near the
Soviet frontier and all are fully equipped for war."[16] Two days later the Times increased
its estimate of German and Romanian divisions massed on the Soviet border, incidentally
coming surprisingly close to the actual total when the Times reported up to 140 Axis
divisions gathered in Eastern Europe.[17]

Stalin ignored the obvious, seemingly for inexplicable reasons, but according to the
conventional wisdom in part from some reasonable concerns. For one, Stalin held a deep
distrust for anything the British told him. Stalin reasonably believed the British planned to
get him to attack Germany or otherwise join the war on the allied side and thereby
renounce his pact with Hitler.[18] It did not help Stalin's amenableness to receiving British
information that Hitler's ostensible second hand man, Rudolf Hess, had, rather implausibly,
stolen a German Me-110 and flown to England on his own initiative in May of 1941 - to
discuss what Stalin could not be sure.[19]

Stalin also harbored a deep distrust for the English in part based upon his belief that a
capitalist nation such as Britain would rather see a communist nation, such as the Soviet
Union, crushed, than a fellow capitalist aligned nation such as National Socialist Germany.
In addition, British aid to Finland in 1939, the lackluster British attempts to renew the First
World War Triple Entente in the summer of 1939, the prior British involvement in the
Russian Civil War, and the mid 19th Century Crimean War all provided recent historical
examples convincing Stalin the British could not be trusted.[20] Moreover, regardless of
the confusing signals reaching Stalin from Britain, and maybe because of the real signals
provided by Soviet intelligence and German border violations, Stalin wanted to buy time. He
needed time so his military could rearm and reorganize to face the German threat.[21]

In June of 1941, Stalin was no doubt in denial; nonetheless, he was also out of the time he
so desperately needed. The stress however was palpable; Stalin reacted to one
intelligence analyst's report, based on information passed from a Soviet sympathizer in the
Luftwaffe, by writing back "To Comrade Merkulov. You can tell your 'source' from the
German Air Headquarters that he can go and fuck his mother. This is not a 'source', but a
disinformant. I. St."[22]

Stalin, more paranoid and agitated than ever, was, for one simple reason, able to nearly
single handedly derail any effort to prepare the Red Army to face a German invasion. Stalin
occupied a position of power and control within the Soviet Union akin to Hitler's in
Germany, i.e. near total. In addition, sycophants surrounded Stalin and dampened the
impact produced by what should have been earthshaking intelligence reports. These
individuals lived in constant fear lest Stalin turn his approval elsewhere, and instruct Beria
and the NKVD to make the offending government official disappear - often permanently.
Stalin did not help matters with a personality that regularly manipulated and deceived
people into following his wishes. When needed, Stalin also habitually resorted to appalling
brutality for accomplishing his goals.

Both Beria and Golikov, the respective Soviet heads of intelligence and military intelligence
in 1941, were political animals conscious in their limited powers, proximity to Stalin, and
none too eager to curry his disfavor by delivering negative reports.[23] Beria even though
he knew better and had at times made efforts to convince Stalin otherwise, wrote Stalin
on June 21st "hours before the largest invasion in history: 'My people and I, Josef
Vissarionovich Stalin, firmly remember your wise prediction: Hitler will not attack in
1941!"[24]

An environment surrounded Stalin catering to his perceived beliefs and wishes; an
environment created in part through the substantial bloodshed of the purges Stalin loosed
upon the Soviet Union during the 1930s as he elevated the state, and him, above the
Party. As such, the Soviet political elite, society, and military often took their cue from
Stalin; rather than risk incurring his distrust. When Stalin's judgment failed, so did his
agents. Brave individuals nevertheless did step forward to warn Stalin Germany was
preparing an invasion. General Proskurov, from Soviet intelligence, daringly argued with
Stalin; regarding Stalin's refusal to approach the German preparations as anything less
than preparations for war. Proskurov's boldness carried a price, and a considerable warning
to others thinking of interjecting their honest opinion into Stalin's erroneous theorizing;
Stalin had him shot.[25]

In June 1941 Stalin had to know Germany was about to invade, no matter his hopes to the
contrary, but, he did not want to believe it and thus, according to many, Stalin's beliefs
carried far more weight in his mind than the evidence challenging those beliefs. On the
other hand, Stalin did attempt to prepare the Soviet military for war, and maybe deter
Germany from attacking, even as he attempted to appease Hitler by sending economic
assistance nearly up to the date of the actual German attack.[26] For example, Stalin
gave a series of speeches designed to bolster morale within the Soviet military
establishment. He also ramped up production of the new T-34 and KV-1 tanks and new
LAGG-3 fighters, weapons systems superior or equal to anything Germany put in the field,
all while building new fortifications in the Soviet Union's western military districts.[27]
Stalin thus stalled for time while denying an armed response to German provocations, even
as German reconnaissance aircraft hunted well over one hundred miles into Soviet
airspace.[28]

Among others in the Soviet Union, General G. Zhukov, one of Stalin's top military officers
and advisors, was beside himself in regards to Stalin's procrastinations, and on June 14th
Zhukov repeatedly demanded Stalin allow full mobilization for war.