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The Revisionist Response to the Conventional Wisdom:

A simple, but shocking, challenge to what we know about the German-Soviet War of
1941-45 has emerged in the past several decades. According to a growing body of
historians and former Soviet era military and political officials; in the spring of 1941 Stalin
knew the Germans were coming and he was stalling for time, but not for the reasons
advanced by the conventional wisdom. Instead, Stalin's play for time was so that he could
launch his own attack on Germany.

The theory Stalin was planning to attack Germany first emerged into the open during the
Cold War when Victor Suvorov - a pseudonym, a trained military intelligence officer from
the Soviet Union, defected to England and published Icebreaker; Who Started the Second
World War? In his book Suvorov claims Stalin planned to attack Nazi Germany in the
summer of 1941 and only Germany's invasion pre-empted a Soviet plan to attack Nazi
Germany and forcefully bring the communist revolution into the heart of Europe. Suvorov
based his contention on the Red Army's deployment in June 1941. Although most have
since derided Suvorov's work, in the past decade Suvorov has also received a considerable
boost for his thesis from a number of publications, and in particular several notable German
historians, backing his views.[31a]

Perhaps the most important book to support Suvorov's thesis, at least backing Suvorov in
part, is Stalin's Folly: The Tragic First Ten Days of World War Two on the Eastern Front, a
book by historian Constantine Pleshakov. Pleshakov argues Stalin knew Hitler would attack,
but was planning his own preemptive attack in 1942; not 1941 as Suvorov argued.
Regardless Pleshakov and Suvorov agree Stalin was readying his army to attack when
Hitler's armies struck first, leaving the Red Army poorly prepared for a defensive campaign.
Pleshakov also puts considerable weight on Stalin's suspicions regarding a British and
German peace treaty as in large part based upon Rudolf Hess's mysterious flight to
Scotland. Hitler as aggressor remains conventional wisdom; however, two sets of
circumstantial evidence have made Suvorov and Pleshakov's different, but related, thesis
plausible.

The Soviet Union's military deployments in the spring of 1941, and certain diplomatic
events, such as the meeting between Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, Hitler and German
Foreign Minister Ribbentrop in Berlin on November 12, 1940, have carried the primary
weight in supporting arguments such as Suvorov's and Pleshakov's. The diplomatic front
has provided significant circumstantial fodder for some who argue Stalin was the aggressor
in his dealings with Hitler. Evidence cited to back this position includes the Soviet
occupation of the Baltic States, the Winter War with Finland and the Soviet annexation of
Romanian land. Some also argue Stalin had planned Molotov's November 1940 trip to Berlin
to delineate respective spheres of influence between Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia
around the Eurasian landmass. [32]

At the November 1940 meeting, Molotov described to German officials the strong Soviet
interests in Finland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Hitler found these interests completely
unacceptable, especially in regards to the latter three countries. Molotov, for his part, was
not stating anything new however; he had merely followed up on past Soviet
communications expressing an interest in maintaining the Balkan and Baltic countries in the
Soviet sphere of influence.

There is no question the Soviet Union did actively expand from 1939-40; absorbing the
Baltic States, parts of Romania, and parts of Finland. At no point during the November
1940 meeting, however, did Molotov indicate to the Germans that the Soviet Union
contemplated any type of near term military solution. Nonetheless, according to the
revisionists, Hitler found Soviet demands highly provocative, no doubt giving Hitler
additional impetus for an invasion he was already months into planning.[33]

Some have taken Stalin's diplomatic signals as being so aggressive they point to Hitler's
moves into Eastern Europe in 1940-41 as a response to the Soviet Union's threatening
posture during the same period. Allegedly, Hitler acted in response rather than as the
aggressor, with such an argument proven by the timing of the official Fuhrer Directive
setting the parameters for the invasion of the Soviet Union; only one month after the
November meeting with Molotov.[34] Arguments such as these can be dismissed out of
hand, the overwhelming body of evidence clearly shows that by November 1940 Hitler and
his military command were, at a minimum, months into planning and preparing for a spring
1941 invasion of the Soviet Union. What Molotov said or implied in November had no
bearing on a decision already made by the German high command months prior to Molotov's
November 1940 arrival in Berlin. Nevertheless, according to American historian John Lukacs,
this has not stopped many German and Russian historians from arguing Stalin was in fact
the aggressor and Germany attacked in 1941 as a preventative measure. An argument
standing on shaky ground if for no other reason than the fact that it initially stemmed from
the questionable claims of several former officers from the Wermacht and most notably
advanced by notable Nazi apologist David Irving in the late 1970s.

More plausibly, in regards to supporting the revisionist position are documents and articles
that have emerged since the Soviet Union's 1991 collapse. These new sources of
information, our second set of circumstantial evidence, could lead one to believe Soviet
offensive military capabilities were being readied in 1941; capabilities that conceivably
formed the basis for a potential assault on Nazi Germany as early as the summer of 1941.
American expert on the Soviet Union, and former professor, Albert Weeks has delved into
this topic in a book examining Stalin's strategic aims during the Second World War's early
years. [35]

Weeks, points to several senior former Red Army officers and Russian political elites who
championed the idea Stalin prepared his own attack on Hitler before Barbarossa preempted
Stalin. Dmitri Volkogonov, a key figure in Red Army indoctrination and political training in
the 1970's, General Oleg Sarin and Colonel Lev Dvoretsky all maintain Stalin possessed
aggressive intentions toward Nazi Germany.

In a paper published in 2000, at the Russian Federation's Ministry Defense Institute of
Military History, Pavel N. Bobylev also claimed Stalin prepared for offensive action against
Germany. The Chief of the Russian General Staff, General Anatoly Kvashnin, published
another paper in the same year. Kvashnin's paper stated the doctrine of offensive
deployment determined the Red Army's layout in the western border region in June 1941 -
alternatively offering an explanation for the Red Army's defensive failings or grounds for
more aggressive interpretations concerning Soviet troop deployments.[36] Examining the
Soviet operational art lends more credence to the former rather than the latter as such a
deployment is understandable in explaining a benign purpose behind these deployments.
Nevertheless, other researchers such as Mikhail I. Mel'tyukhov and A.N. Yakovlev point to
recently discovered documents from the early 1940s; documents also purportedly proving
the offensive nature behind Soviet intentions.

The most important document allegedly proving Stalin's aggressive intent in 1941 comes
from the Soviet General Staff. A document prepared and disseminated on May 15, 1941
and co-authored by Timoshenko and Zhukov. Timoshenko and Zhukov were both
extraordinarily aggressive military leaders, and in this document argued for pre-emptive
attacks on German troops immediately before Germany's final deployment to attack Russia.
In essence, Timoshenko and Zhukov presented a theory somewhat similar to the modern
American doctrine prescribing pre-emptive war.[37] Zhukov's bold plans were certainly not
out of character for him.

Georgy K. Zhukov was born in 1896. He later joined the Imperial Russian army, and served
as a private in the cavalry during the First World War. During the war Zhukov was twice
wounded and received several honors, including twice receiving the prestigious St.
George's Cross.[38] After the Bolshevik Revolution Zhukov volunteered for the Red Army
and served with distinction; eventually ranking as among the Red Army's premier officers
during the Second World War. Zhukov possessed tremendous organizational skills and was
at times a brilliant instinctual leader remarkable for his aggressiveness, skill, and
ruthlessness.[39]

Thus, it is no wonder Zhukov argued for actively defending against German aggression.
Weeks develops the argument Stalin prepared for a more aggressive Soviet approach to
Germany in 1941 by linking Zhukov's largely well known May 15, 1941 document with
several speeches made by Stalin; most notably on May 5, 1941 at the Soviet military
academies graduation. Stalin's speeches from May 5, 1941 were produced in full for the
first time in 1996 by Yakovlev's huge two-volume primary source document collection
entitled The Year 1941.[40] Weeks reproduced the full text of Stalin's speech from
Yakovlev and quotes Stalin as stating,

"Up to now, up to this time, we have pursued a line of defense (oborona) until such time
as our army was rearmed and was supplied with the modern means of waging war. But
now, when our army has been reconstructed and has in its hands the technology for
contemporary battle, now that we have become strong-now is the time to go from defense
to offense. While securing defense (oborona) of our country, we must act in an offensive
way (deistvovat' nasupatel'nym obrazom). We must switch over in our defense policy to
offensist (nastupatel'nykh) actions. We need to instill in our indoctrination, our propaganda
and agitation and in our media an offensist spirit. The Red Army is a modern army. It is an
army that is offensist."[41]

Weeks states that high ranking Soviet military and diplomatic officials such as Molotov,
Malenkov, Shcherbakov, Vasilievsky, Vatutin, and Zhdanov all authored or otherwise had a
hand in documents that spoke to the Red Army's offensive intent in deployment.
Furthermore, Red Army Major-General Petr Grigorenko, who fought in the initial border
battles following the German attack, stated, after the War; Soviet deployments although
disguised in intent were offensive in nature. Russian historian Aleksandr Nekrich also
describes a shift in Stalin's speeches and language indicating a corresponding shift in
military deployment posture during the critical weeks leading up to Barbarossa.[42]

Yet, in spite of the possibility revisionists may be correct in their supposition Stalin planned
to attack Germany, substantial holes remain in theories attacking the conventional wisdom.
For example, pointing to basic military contingency plans as evidence of a purported attack
on Germany ignores the reality all army's did and do make such plans. There remains no
evidence the Red Army was, in the spring of 1941, engaged in the systematic operational
planning for an attack similar to what Germany had pursued against the Soviet Union
following France's defeat in the summer of 1940.

Moreover, even though historians exploring whether Stalin was planning to Germany have
faced considerable barriers even since the Soviet Union dissolved, and with Putin's recent
decisions outright denials of access to appropriate Soviet era archives, the conventional
wisdom remains the best supported position available today. The conventional wisdom
currently trumps the revisionist position for one simple reason. If for no other reason than
what is disclosed by a further examination into the Red Army's disposition in June 1941 we
can see the Soviet Union was far from ready to launch an offensive war against Germany.

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