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By Steven D. Mercatante[1] Introduction: The Second World War ended over sixty years ago, yet much about the War remains either misunderstood or unknown. In particular, historians have debated and sought to understand Stalin's decision making process in the months leading up to the June 22, 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union. A decision-marking process ranking to this day among the War's most enduring mysteries mostly because Stalin spent the spring of 1941 reviewing overwhelming evidence proving Hitler was about to attack, and yet, because he refused to believe it; helped Germany to inflict defeats on the Red Army so catastrophic as to nearly destroy the Soviet Union. Stalin's judgment during these months, weeks and during the final days before the German invasion, today remains most commonly regarded as motivated by a desire to maintain the alliance formed between the Soviet Union and Germany in August 1939. Nevertheless, in recent decades an increasing number of historians have refuted this explanation for Stalin's behavior and have argued Stalin was planning to launch a massive pre-emptive attack on German forces in East Prussia and Poland. The following article will examine this debate by first examining the conventional wisdom regarding Stalin's leadership immediately prior to the 1941 German attack on the Soviet Union. A conventional wisdom built on a seemingly overwhelming body of evidence arguing Stalin, during the spring of 1941, desperately sought to honor his treaty of non-aggression and mutual economic support with Germany. Moreover, a conventional wisdom arguing Stalin, in spite of examining considerable evidence Germany was about to attack the Soviet Union, willfully ignored such evidence in a misguided belief Hitler would not attack the Soviet Union. Second, this article will look at the revisionist position. A position emerging over the past thirty years and one arguing Stalin actually planned to attack Germany. Moreover, but for the German invasion Stalin would have done so, possibly as soon as the late summer of 1941. Those challenging the conventional wisdom have relied heavily on the Red Army's deployment in the spring of 1941; arguing these redeployments were for a pre-emptive strike on Germany. |
The Globe At War |
Revisiting one of World War II's greatest Controversies: Was the Soviet Union preparing to attack Germany in 1941? |
Stalin (on right) speaking with Molotov in 1945 - Picture Courtesy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library |
Lastly, this article weighs the strength of each argument, the conventional wisdom and the revisionist position, by examining the strength and readiness of the Red Army on the eve of War. In taking a renewed look at the Red Army in the spring of 1941, it may be possible to ascertain whether the Red Army was even ready for launching a campaign against Germany in the spring of 1941; no less defending against a German invasion. Furthermore, through examining the Red Army perhaps we will also gain a greater understanding as to what Stalin intended to do with his colossal military machine in the spring and summer of 1941. 1 |2 |3 |4 |5 |6 Next Page |