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The Globe At War |
Revisiting one of World War II's greatest Controversies: Was the Soviet Union preparing to attack Germany in 1941? |
Unfortunately, for the Soviet Union, many of the same problems plaguing the Red Army ground forces also defined the Red Army Air Force's combat capability in 1941. On paper, the Red Army Air Force appeared massive and unbeatable. In June 1941, the Red Army deployed 19,533 combat aircraft, ranking as by far the world's largest air forces. From this number, once stripping away specialized and training formations, the remaining aircraft still totaled an impressive 13,288 operational aircraft. In the west, 7,133 Soviet combat aircraft faced the German threat, representing an advantage reaching nearly 3:1 in numbers of machinery and pilots.[89] The large Red Army air force nonetheless stood in flux in 1941. Equipment needed replacement, and the Soviet air armies needed re-organization. The Red Army Air Force's numbers were in some ways illusory; the Red Army Air Force maintained many obsolete aircraft in front line squadrons. For example, far too many Soviet pilots prepared for battle in underpowered I-16 fighters. The I-16 possessed a top speed of only approximately 300 mph. The newest generation Me-109F, with a top speed over 75 m.p.h. greater, and equipping most of the Luftwaffe's fighter squadrons in 1941 woefully outclassed the I-16. Even more obsolete aircraft remained on duty than the I-16 in the Red Army Air Force; I-153 bi-plane fighters for one. Approximately 3,400 I-153s rolled off Soviet assembly lines in 1939-1940, in spite of their complete obsolescence.[90] Next generation aircraft, ready to compete with the Luftwaffe, meanwhile were just being readied for service in 1941. Improved and combat worthy aircraft such as the MiG-3 fighter, LaGG-3 fighter, Pe-2 dive-bomber, and Il-2, Shturmovik, ground attack aircraft had begun production during the summer of 1940. These newer aircraft designs matched up well with the Me-109 fighter, He-111 and Ju-88 bombers and Ju-87 Stuka comprising Germany's front line fighter and attack squadrons. The newer Russian aircraft however could not fully replace the older, obsolete aircraft until mid-1942.[91] |
Fighter aircraft represented the Red Army's predominant aircraft in 1941; this represented a noticeable difference in doctrine between the Luftwaffe and Red Army air force. Whereas the Luftwaffe preferred to destroy enemy aircraft on the ground through bombing airfields, Soviet doctrine revolved around attaining air superiority in the air. Thus, the Soviet air command lacked a knockout punch capability. In addition, with most of the fighter aircraft obsolete in 1941, a real disparity in power existed with the numerically inferior but qualitative superior Luftwaffe fighter pilots and aircraft. The Russian military reorganization had an even more profound impact upon the Red Army Air Force than the ground forces. The air force infrastructure underwent tremendous expansion and redeployment in the months leading up to Barbarossa. Coupled with the vast numbers of different aircraft entering and leaving service, a nightmarish command and logistical effect resulted; hardly the basis for an Air Force preparing to carry the War into Germany.[92] Infrastructure expansion in the western border regions proceeded much slower than necessary; whether for defensive or offensive purposes. Consequently, the Red Army Air Force shoehorned aircraft onto ever more crowded airfields. Overcrowding limited airfields with row after row of aircraft therefore meant the Red Army Air Force played directly into Luftwaffe doctrine for attaining air superiority.[93] The Red Army air force also lacked appropriate pilot training programs. Pilot training ranks as among the most important measures in assessing an air force's combat readiness. The Red Army Air Force however had neglected its training programs, soon costing its pilots dearly. In many cases, individuals with barely greater seniority than those they instructed led the way. [94] The Red Army Air Force's top leadership lacked experience. The critical Western Front's Air Force Chief was the 33-year-old General Kopets. P.V. Rychagov served as the 29-year-old head of the Air Force until reassigned in April 1941, and then later arrested. The Chief of the Air Defense Administration, General G.M.Shtern and the Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Aviation, General Ia. V. Smushkevich were also arrested just over one week prior to the onset of the German invasion.[95] The turnover in the Red Army Air Force's top ranks staggered the organization. Finally, the Red Army Air Force squandered its overall numerical superiority via a poor organization that spread Soviet squadrons across the Soviet Union. Germany meanwhile maintained strict adherence to concentrated strength as an organizing principle; at least in the air.[96] The huge Red Army featured serious weaknesses; in the air, and on the ground. The Red Army's leadership also represented a huge question mark in 1941. In addition, the Red Army was poorly deployed, thinly, butting up against the border, vitiating its sizeable numbers, by creating across the board weakness; without the concentrations of strength necessary to either counter an invasion or deliver a knockout blow of their own. 1 |2 |3 |4 |5 |6 Next Page |
An Ilyushin Il-2 Sturmovik ground attack aircraft - Picture from Russia and in Public Domain |