SMansteinBookReview

Reviewed by Steven Douglas Mercatante [1]

Few would argue with the assertion Erich von Manstein ranked among the best
operational level military commanders of the Second World War, if not the best.
Nevertheless, because of Manstein's decisions during and after the War, he also ranks
among the War's most controversial figures. In spite of Manstein's central role in the
War however, there has been no official biography written about him. In Field Marshal
von Manstein, The Janus Head, A Portrait noted military historian Marcel Stein tackles
this void in the scholarship on the War. In doing so Stein has driven a stake through
the heart of myths long enduring in regards to Manstein and his role in the War. In
addition, Stein also broadened the scope of his work and ably explained the German
General Staff's overall moral decay, participation in the Holocaust, and central place in
mismanaging the German war effort.

Manstein stood as a symbol of everything that explained the German Wermacht's
incredible tactical and operational level military prowess during the War, and its moral
depravity. Perhaps the most important value Stein's work provides for the military
history enthusiast, among many, is in how Stein links his discussion of Manstein to
larger themes marking the War and how we have come to remember it.

For example, Stein uses Manstein as a vehicle to explain how deeply implicated the
German General Staff and field commanders were in the Holocaust; as well as how they
self-servingly shaped a tremendously inaccurate picture of the War. Stein regularly
transitions away from his discussion of Manstein's career to explain how the German
officer corps' embrace of National Socialist ideology tainted a centuries old tradition of
military excellence. As a result, even though the Third Reich could call upon a far more
talented officer corps than Imperial Germany possessed in the First World War, the
criminal behavior characteristic of the Wermacht's officer corps played a central role in
leading to the Third Reich's destruction.

Stein demonstrates how Hitler's best military leaders, men such as Manstein, at times
delivered stunning victories but, perhaps as a result, consistently underrated and
misunderstood the strength and power of a Red Army eventually playing the central
role in destroying the National Socialist experiment. For example, and, on the one hand,
Manstein was an operational genius. He was the author of the plan that defeated the
combined strength of the British, French, Belgian, and Dutch armies in mere weeks.
Whereas just twenty years prior and after four years of warfare Imperial Germany had
failed to do the same. In addition, Manstein's leadership of a Motorized Corps during
Barbarossa's first months clearly established him as among the War's best leaders of
large mobile units. Manstein added to this reputation when, early in 1943, he delivered
a counterstroke so stunning it knocked the surging Red Army back on its heels.
Manstein's counteroffensive, even though it had followed the Red Army's greatest
success to date in the War, convinced Zhukov and Stalin they needed to marshal the
Red Army's available strength to make a defensive stand later that year and put off
their plans for taking the offensive until after the anticipated German summer offensive
at Kursk.

Events at Kursk would prove critical to understanding the linkage between Manstein's
failings and the mistakes made by his peers in the German officer corps' top ranks. At
Kursk, one of the two elements explaining Manstein's often ignored flaws as a military
leader were perhaps best revealed; his monumental arrogance and resultant inability to
admit when he had made a mistake. Manstein's hubristic approach to fighting the Red
Army took center stage in the events at Kursk. Manstein played a central role in
convincing Hitler to launch Operational Citadel even though the Red Army had turned
the Kursk salient into one of the strongest fortresses in the world; a fact of which the
Germans were well aware. Then, after Citadel had failed to achieve its stated
objectives, Manstein disregarded reality and pushed for a continuation of the offensive.
Manstein then failed to take responsibility for Citadel's failure even as the Red Army
launched its own summer offensive and drove several German armies to the breaking
point.

Manstein's second major flaw, as regards his military leadership, was his naked ambition
and concomitant desire to head the German General Staff; an ambition prominently
presenting itself at numerous times during the War. Manstein's ambition revealed itself
most spectacularly in his repeated attempts to cover up his own mistakes. A failure of
command most regularly revealed during his leadership of the 11th Army and Army
Group Don; when in both instances he avoided making critical decisions. For example,
in his role as the commander of Army Group Don, Manstein refused to make a decision
ostensibly his to make and failed to issue an unambiguous breakout order from the
Stalingrad pocket; an order that may have saved part of the encircled German Sixth
Army. Manstein's lack of courage in regards to circumventing Hitler's orders
demonstrated how Manstein placed his own career goals first; moral cowardice was
part and parcel of his leadership style. Moreover, Manstein frequently threw his
subordinates to the wolves; ostensibly from fear of Hitler's wrath even though
numerous other high-ranking German military leaders would disregard Hitler's orders
during the War, and get away relatively unscathed in spite of their transgressions.
These men, such as Hausser and Model, at important times in the War put their men
first, even though it might have meant the end of their careers.

Manstein was more than emblematic of the German army's successes and failings on
the battlefield. Stein also helps the reader understand the latent anti-Semitism and
racism pervading the German officer corps during the War through exploring Manstein's
regular participation in the genocide defining the Wermacht's campaign in Eastern
Europe. Stein's findings help illustrate the German officer corps' criminal depravity in
not only ignoring the laws of war, but assisting with the genocide of millions of Slavs,
Jews, gypsies, and other innocent human beings.

Furthermore, Stein also examines how following the War Manstein led the way in
refashioning the historiography of the War. Under Manstein's influence this
historiography flowed from an image and myth created by leading German military
figures who survived the War. This myth has, unfortunately, stood up shockingly well
over time. A myth that has led millions to believe the Wermacht did not participate in
genocide, but, instead served as a professional and honorable institution that not only
remained above the SS perpetrated slaughter, but also knew almost nothing of it.
Moreover, not only did the Wermacht allegedly fight with clean hands, according to
Manstein and his followers, but these men also planted a myth arguing had the
Wermacht directed the War free of Hitler's interference Germany would have won.
Stein's book, if for no other reason is important reading in how he comprehensively
takes apart these pernicious myths.

Stein's work spans decades of German military history. The first half of the book offers
a summary of Manstein's career, then moves through an in depth investigation into the
most important events in his career. These chapters include a look at Manstein's great
military achievements, as well as his mistakes; with the Battle for France, Manstein's
leadership of Army Group Don, and the German assault at Kursk, including the planning
phase, covered in detail. The second half of the book first examines Manstein's
decision to stand by Hitler and decline to join the German military resistance
movement. The book then describes Manstein's participation in the Holocaust, his trial
for war crimes after the War, and finishes by demolishing Manstein's post-War
attempts to cast himself in the best possible light.

My complaints with the work are minor. Although not an operational or tactical military
history, a few more maps would have been helpful. The book covers events taking
place across Europe; in particular, some of the villages mentioned in the Soviet Union
are obscure even to the well-informed reader. Additional maps could have helped
greatly in understanding where these events took place. In addition, the editing was
somewhat sloppy at times, not enough to take away from the book's strengths but
enough to prove both mildly annoying, and potentially a cause of confusion for some
one with only a casual knowledge of the War.

Overall, Stein's book is a valuable addition to the available literature on the War.
Stein's work fills important gaps in what is widely known about the War, adds to what
is becoming known about the Wermacht's involvement in the Holocaust, and helps
destroy decades of myths still prevalent today; more than sixty years after the War
ended. I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in learning more about
Germany and the Second World War.

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