SGermanyandAxisPowersBookReview

Reviewed by Steven Douglas Mercatante [1]

Richard Dinardo's Germany and the Axis Powers fills an invaluable niche in the literature
currently available on the Second World War's European Theater. In particular, Dinardo
has focused on Germany's relationship with Finland, Hungary, Italy and Romania;
producing a concise but revealing analysis into the numerous problems that derailed
the Axis coalition.

In Germany and the Axis Powers Dinardo has produced a book not only examining how
dysfunctional the Axis alliance really was but, more importantly, why the Axis failed to
come anywhere near the level of cooperation and success forged by the Allied alliance;
a coalition featuring arguably far greater handicaps in a membership consisting of the
most powerful capitalist democracies coupled with Josef Stalin's dictatorial communist
empire. In spite of the obvious comparisons that can be made between the Axis and
the Allies however, Germany and the Axis Powers focuses its attention upon the inner
workings of the European portion of the Axis alliance.

Dinardo begins his book by putting Germany's Second World War approach to coalitional
warfare in the historical context within which Prussia and Imperial Germany traditionally
operated in regards to partnering with other nations during times of war. The remainder
of the book builds upon Germany's historically inadequate approach to coalitional
warfare and thoroughly explores the strategic level diplomatic failures, and infrequent
successes, defining the Axis alliance's record. Dinardo also deftly interweaves
operational level examples from combat occurring on the ground, at sea and in the air.
One of the great strengths of Germany and the Axis Powers is Dinardo's work in
avoiding an oversimplified approach to Germany's interactions with each of its allies and
in how Dinardo breaks down the varying levels of success found by some service
branches within the Axis while describing how other service branches failed miserably in
their attempts at collaboration. The range covered by Germany and the Axis Powers is
all the more remarkable considering the book wraps up in under 300 pages but reveals
quite a bit of the often times only marginally explored issues going far toward explaining
why the War ended as it did. In particular, Germany and the Axis Powers covers in
detail the problems plaguing the relationship between Germany and what should have
been a potent Italian ally.

I recommend Dinardo's book without hesitation, nevertheless it is perhaps in the time
he spends on the Italian and German part of the Axis alliance that is this book's
greatest weakness. There is little doubt as to the fascination with which a reader will
devour Dinardo's description of the sheer ineptness and self-interested
single-mindedness with which Hitler and Mussolini mostly independently waged war.
There is also little doubt as to how important such an analysis is toward explaining Axis
failure in the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, Germany and the Axis Powers is a book
marketed and packaged as one covering not just the relationship between Italy and
Germany but also Germany and Hungary, Germany and Romania, and Germany and
Finland - with the bilateral approach taken here to listing these relationships entirely
indicative of how far from a true coalition the Axis truly was. Given Dinardo's obvious
skill as a researcher and writer this reader for one would not have been at all
disappointed had Germany and the Axis Powers come in closer to 400 pages and more
thoroughly covered the contributions made by Finland, Hungary and Romania to the
Axis alliance. In particular even a modest dip into the operational military history would
have been rewarding especially in regards to the German/Hungarian defensive efforts in
Hungary during 1944/45 and the German/Romanian success in stopping a major Soviet
offensive into Romania during the spring of 1944. In addition, it would have been of
great interest to read a description of the Romanian role in buttressing the Soviet
Fronts deployed within Hungary following Romania's capitulation to the Soviet Union.
Finally, a few more maps would have helped greatly in following events described in
Eastern Europe.

Although a highly specialized book, Germany and the Axis Powers is broken up into
easily digestible parts, is an enjoyable read and is a great secondary source for any
Second World War researcher. It is not however, for the person with only a passing
knowledge of the War. Nevertheless, if you are already more than a little familiar with
events in Europe during the Second World War and are seeking an introduction into
how and why the Axis alliance failed to effectively compete with the impressive Allied
approach to coalitional warfare then this book is for you.

Return to Book Review Page