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Turning Doctrine into Practice and Organization

Training involves bringing doctrine into practice as more than developed doctrines for war
fighting are required to build a strong military. Army's need to convert raw human material
into trained soldiers capable of following established doctrines; especially technically
complex teachings requiring the mental agility to execute combined arms coordination in a
timely and fluid fashion. Moreover, in order to train the millions of men needed by a nation
state expecting to fight a total war, an army had to have a professional cadre to grow
from. Germany had just such a cadre.

From 1939-1945 roughly 20 million men served in the German armed forces. Only 1-2 million
volunteers served during the war; conscription provided the overwhelming majority of the
Third Reich's soldiers.[54] Yet this largely conscript army bested its opponents throughout
World War Two; especially when fighting on a one to one basis, and oftentimes even when
facing far worse odds. The Wermacht established such a reputation for excellence it is
widely regarded today as a professional army instead of for example a "citizen soldier army"
as American historian Stephen Ambrose labeled the US Army during the Second World War.
Seekt played a critical role in emplacing training regimens that taught the conscript German
army to fight as professionals. Seekt's work helped create a military organization historians
to this day refer to as among human history's premier fighting and killing organizations.

Seekt believed in what his training and experience had taught him; qualitative superiority
over an enemy could best numerical advantages. He choose to emphasize this belief when
he laid the foundational excellence later defining the greatest strength maintained by the
German army in World War Two; its NCO's (non-commissioned officers) and junior officers.
German NCO's and junior officers stood out as among the best-trained and effective small
unit tacticians during the entire war.

Seekt emphasized NCO and junior officer development through exploiting a loophole in the
Versailles Treaty. This loophole allowed Germany's 100,000 man Reichswehr to field as
many NCOs as it wanted. As a result, Seekt elevated NCO training to a thoroughness and
selectivity that defined officer training in other armies. Seekt literally filled the army with
well-trained NCOs. After Hitler took power the Reichswehr's NCOs became the officer corps
for the German army. By 1926, the 100,000 man German army only had 36,500 privates;
NCOs represented the majority; Versailles allowed only 4,000 true officers.[55]

The aggressive combined arms mobile doctrines advocated by Seekt required men who
could fight and think under far more intellectually and physically demanding circumstances
than required by those fighting in fixed defensive fortifications - the latter representing the
soldier sought by the French army in the 1920s and 1930s. Seekt used the Versailles
manpower limit constraint as an opportunity for him to select only the best human material
for the German army. Then he initiated the world's most arduous training regimes to
prepare these men for combat.[56]

Seekt therefore created a professional core in his army when the world's remaining armies
still emulated Napoleon's example of massive conscript armies mobilized at a moment's call.
Von Seekt in his 1928 book entitled Thoughts of a Soldier spoke to the poor investment
return produced through maintaining a large conscript army. Seekt worked this into his
larger embrace of mobility's importance in arguing;

"Mass becomes immobile; it cannot maneuver and therefore cannot win victories, it can
only crush by sheer weight….A conscript mass, whose training has been brief and
superficial is 'cannon fodder' in the worst sense of the word, if pitted against a small
number of practiced technicians on the other side."[57]

Seekt further stated "In brief, the whole future of warfare appears to me to lie in the
employment of mobile armies, relatively small but of high quality, and rendered distinctly
more effective by the addition of aircraft…" Writing over three quarters of a century ago,
Seekt presciently described the characteristics describing the foremost army in the early
21st Century world; the United States Army.[58]

Seekt also took advantage of German ties with the Soviet Union to expose these men to
the newest ideas and train them in using weapons banned by Versailles. The 1922 Treaty
of Rapallo had brought German closer with the Soviet Union and Von Seekt took full
advantage. The impact produced by his decisions lasted long after he had retired in 1926.
German soldiers trained in the Soviet Union until 1933 when Hitler rose to power and, for
ideological reasons, canceled the German-Soviet military relationship.[59]

In the 1920s German weapons manufacturers joined the German military and set up shop in
the Soviet Union. Companies such as Daimler, Krupp, and Rhinemetall all used training
grounds in the Soviet Union, such as the Kazan Tank School, to develop and test the ideas
that led to Germany's first generation tanks.[60] Paradoxically Versailles, although crippling
the German military establishment and most critically the economy to support it, had
provided Germany with its professional officer corps. Moreover, these officers enjoyed
valuable time to test doctrine and new technologies integrated into older traditions without
facing as much resistance as officers in other armies felt from politically powerful and
entrenched military and economic interests.[61]

Innovation characterized the 1920s-1930s German military establishment. Officers and men
alike were encouraged to study military strategy, history, tactics, as well as think
independently.[62] The German army consistently updated its military training manuals and
supplemented rote learning with philosophies embracing innovation and fostering a free
exchange of ideas. Instruction was rigorous, but also intellectually challenging and
stimulating. Instruction centered on active thinking to solve problems and technical training
enjoyed a significant emphasis as well. German military training often disregarded the class
divisions characterizing the British and French armies of the era; German officers and their
men were encouraged to work together. German Instructor's discouraged rigid adherence
to old ideas and an era of intellectual creativity bloomed.[63]

In training programs with goals such as these German officers and men became experts at
dealing with the numerous often-unforeseen problems perpetually cropping up on
battlefields and stymieing those seeking to reduce the art of warfare to a scientific
formula. In the 19th Century Von Clausewitz had famously grouped many of the inevitable
issues to emerge during campaigns, naming these elements that could and frequently did
throw a campaign off its intended path as "friction." The German army's training program
and pedagogical goals, in emphasizing independence, creativity, and innovation, best set
up its officers and men for battlefield success by imbuing in them the ability to deal with
problems as they cropped up.[64]

In addition to pedagogical advantages in German training programs, German officers gained
ample experience. For example, they participated in far more large-scale exercises than
their British and French future opponents did.[65] Regular German participation in
large-scale exercises also resulted from the organization chosen for the German army. An
organization best implementing the doctrines taught at German military academies and
training programs.

The division served as the German army's standard combat formation - in line with
experiences during the First World War. The German army further divided its divisions into
three regiments of approximately 3,000 men each, with supporting arms and a
headquarters unit making up the remainder of the 12,000-man division. In combat, this
organization often meant two divisional regiments engaged the enemy with one held in
reserve. The reserve aspect was absolutely critical to German war making. Even the
smallest coherent battle formations, squads or platoons for example, were trained to use
reserves - even if this meant only two or three men. Reserves were considered critical for
a number of reasons including; for exploiting opportunities opened up either offensively or
defensively; in particular for reinforcing a threatened section of the line, or to
counterattack an enemy breaking through defensive positions.[66] Overall, the division
thus possessed the capability of fighting equally well on either offense or defense.

The Germans had developed the three regiment, "triangular division" in 1915. Yet, in spite
of the obvious advantages from this organizational pattern some remained slow to copy.
For example, as late as 1940 the U.S. Army organized its divisions along a "square" model
with two infantry brigades comprising two regiments each; a formation much more unwieldy
and inefficient.[67]

Germany also organized its operational level formations, divisional sized and larger units, in
a triangular model. The Corps, comprising three divisions, was the largest formation so
organized. The triangular model was not dogmatically adhered to however; German military
leaders expected individual units to operate independently, and accordingly equipped them
to do so.

Unlike many other armies also organized into divisions and corps, German units enjoyed the
freedom to operate outside their table of organization; this was an essential feature in
German combined arms doctrine. Senior German officers often broke up existing units for
reassignment into combined arms teams integrating and taking weapons from throughout
the larger division and using them in much smaller groups called Kampfgruppen (battle
groups).[68] Furthermore, certain weapons were emphasized as particularly useful. For
example, light machineguns featuring high rates of fire provided the devastating firepower
German small unit doctrines demanded. The prevalent use of light, mobile machineguns
characterized the German infantry squad throughout the Second World War. Accordingly,
in a one on one fight with a comparably sized enemy unit German infantry rarely fought
outgunned.

The Kampfgruppen thus extended the stormtrooper (Stosstrupp) infiltration tactics dating
from the First World War.[69] This developmental lineage traced back to lessons learned
from the First World War did not stop with the organization of the army's infantry backbone
either. The period from the late nineteenth century through the First World War had
featured an extended revolution in technologies applied to warfare; a revolution in
weapons systems producing far more innovation and change than even during the Second
World War.[70]

In the initial mid 19th century innovative wave, railroads and the telegraph forever
changed logistics, communications, and mobilization. In a second late 19th century
innovative wave machine guns, poison gas, and vastly improved artillery pieces changed
the battlefield yet again. During a third technological wave, this time early in the 20th
century, the internal combustion engine offered, among other things, a technological
solution to the problem posed by static attritional warfare.

In Part Two of this article series we shall examine how the German army responded to the
internal combustion engine and why long standing German tradition, doctrines, training, and
organization allowed the German military establishment to reap considerable rewards from
technologies available to all its potential military rivals, but inadequately realized by these
same nations.

Consequently, it will then be possible to see why Nazi Germany's army took on the shape it
did in the late summer of 1939, thus, among other things, answering larger questions
regarding German readiness for war and how Germany bested its significantly larger foes
during the Wars early years.

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