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All of these men had faced the same problem Germany did in the twentieth century; a central position in Europe with enemies on virtually every border. To these men, military mobility represented the central component in addressing such a gross geostrategic disadvantage. This German quest for pursuing the battle of annihilation easily merged into strategic concepts embracing total war, and became tradition; an operational tradition focused on defeating an enemy army in a war of movement or "bewegungskrieg".[4] The goal of fighting a quick war of maneuver to crush one enemy and then wheel the army about to face another would dominate the strategic decisions made by first, Prussia, and then Germany's military and political leaders.[5] During the eighteenth century Frederick the Great followed a nascent Prussian military tradition begun in the seventeenth century by The Great Elector. Frederick strung together a series of victories, including at Rossbach and Leuthen where he relied on his army's mobility to sweep much larger armies from the field of battle. Military historian Robert Citino has gone so far as to state Frederick's victory at Rossbach was more than just a moment further cementing the primacy of maneuver as a central tenant in Prussian military thought and practice but to also state Frederick "discovered the art of operational-level warfare" at Rossbach. [5a] In addition, at Leuthen, Frederick's armies also displayed two more characteristics later playing a critical role in the Wermacht's future successes. First, Frederick's great victories came from a system relying on the independence of the local commander to make his own decisions in regards to solving the problem of how best to defeat his foe on the battlefield - a theory articulated by later military observers as part of a German system of command for better or worse known as Auftragstaktik. Second, from early in Prussia's history the Prussian army recognized the value of combined arms in defeating its foes; with the Prussian artillery, infantry and cavalry frequently working synergistically to defeat the foremost European military powers of the day.[5b] In the decades that followed Frederick's victories the Prussian army would continue to develop its approach to warfare - mostly on the battlefield but also in writing - repeatedly stressing the importance of mobility, maneuver, combined-arms, and the independence of the local commander on the operational and tactical level. By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, General Staff officers in the Imperial German Army planned from within the framework built by their predecessors and with the resources provided by a General Staff far larger than its Prussian antecedent.[6] Moreover, late 19th century and early 20th century Chiefs of the German General Staff enjoyed substantially more support in planning for war than past Prussian field commanders such as Freidrich Wilhelm von Seydlitz, in the 18th century, or the highly aggressive Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher, in the19th century. The Imperial German Army's top leadership primary advantage over its Prussian antecedent came from the sheer size of the General Staff. [7] By 1914, the expanded General Staff, through standardized work procedures, managed the business of warfare on the 20th century battlefield.[8] Nevertheless, the problems confronting the modern German General Staff remained strikingly similar to those faced in the past. For instance, as the 20th century began, Germany's primary continental military goal revolved around facing the need to defeat both a French and Russian foe in a rapid one-two punch, with for example the Russian foe annihilated only after destroying French resistance. In preparing a framework for accomplishing this goal, Schlieffen cited Clausewitz, who had previously wrote "Whatever the final act (in defeating an enemy) may turn on in any given case, the beginning is invariably the same-the annihilation of the enemy's armed forces, which implies a major victory and their actual destruction."[9] This merger between operational doctrine and strategic theory produced unique benefits for Germany when adhered to, but disastrous results when ignored. For example, during the First World War, some have argued the German army's assault at Verdun sought to bleed the French Army to death in an attritional battle - thus breaking away from German military tradition.[10] Army Chief of Staff General Erich von Falkenhayn had put this disastrous plan together.[11] During ten months at Verdun Falkenhayn's plan resulted in 337,000 German casualties against 377,200 French casualties. Hardly a war winning strategy for Germany.[12] In 1916, after the Verdun debacle, Lieutenant General Erich Ludendorff introduced several innovations, when he and Field Marshall Paul von Hindenburg took command over the German war leadership. Germany's First World War General Staff performerd well at the tactical and operational level but struggled strategically. Chaos characterized German strategic leadership. Even as late as 1914, Kaiser Willhelm II entertained a convoluted military hierarchy with 48 army and naval officers allowed near constant access to him.[13] In an effort to strategically mobilize the German population Ludendorff and Hindenburg more seriously brought ideology into the mix, through "the struggle of peoples" seeking to mobilize entire societies to fight wars, and not just through mobilizing armies.[14] The German Defense Minister from 1928 to 1932, General Wilhelm Groener, also believed in such theories and wrote "It is necessary to organize the entire strength of the people for fighting and working." Groener's writing reflected his Social Darwinist beliefs, with modern warfare impacting "the future of the race."[15],[16] In the years following the First World War National Socialists embraced total war from Ludendorff's social and ideological perspective, producing positive and negative influences on the German war machine. For example, on the one hand, Germany developed immense economic power during the 1930s. On the other hand, however, ideological concerns also became paramount to match the economic concerns driving some National Socialists forward. "For National Socialist leaders…effective and efficient pursuit of the war (later) relied not only on the organization of economic production but also on the adoption of political policies, based on ideological analyses, which would allow the nation to pursue the war without treason or dissent…Hitler saw total war as a realization of German ideology. The resources allocated to anti-Semitic policies, propaganda, and maintaining public morale, and ideological education were part of the 'German doctrine of total war.'…In understanding the leadership's approach to total war, 'the total claim of the ideology…must be taken into account just as much as the striving to achieve more efficient forms of armaments production."[17] Hitler agreed wholeheartedly with defining war as a total societal experience for race survival. Richard Overy in describing Hitler's conception of war states; "Hitler longed for it [war], not simply as revenge for defeat in 1918 and the putative peace settlement that followed, but because war would provide the ultimate justification for his self-appointed dictatorial mission, to forge a tough new community of Germans, capable of carving out and defending a new empire and slaying the Jewish-Bolshevik dragon. War was a necessary act of historical regeneration and redemption."[18] Hitler wrote in his 'Second Book' history is "the course of a people's struggle for existence" with war "the ultimate weapon with which a people fights for its daily bread." Hitler knew in such a struggle tremendous advantage attached to the nation mobilizing "the whole strength of the people" and not "limited preparation for war." Hitler further wrote "all other desires are unimportant" when compared to the need for society to shackle its direction to creating a nation capable of waging war in totality.[19] In August 1936, Hitler described further the importance of a total preparation for war in the coming racial struggle; "Germany will as always have to be regarded as the focus of the Western world against the attacks of Bolshevism. I only want, in these lines, to express my conviction that this crisis cannot and will not fail to occur. The extent of the military development of our resources cannot be too large, nor its pace too swift."[20] The German military establishment appreciatively reflected Hitler's views in its 1930s publications, as well as through the statements and writings made by its top officers. In the military magazine Deutsche Wehr one editorial stated "Peace must be subordinated to the requirements of war. War is the secret ruler of our century; peace no longer signifies more than a simple armistice between two wars."[21] As National Socialist views on total warfare evolved, and found acceptance in the 1920s and 1930s German military establishment, Germany also sought to rebuild its armed forces through more traditional means. Initially, however the rebuilding process faced sharp constraints, for it needed to occur within the limitations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. The Treaty of Versailles left post First World War Germany with a seemingly impotent armed forces establishment, no heavy weapons; especially no aircraft, tanks, or capital ships and submarines, nor the capacity to produce these weapons. Versailles also had stripped heavy industry from the German economic base. In addition, Versailles disbanded the storied and proud German General Staff. Versailles thus, in theory, destroyed Germany's source of innovation in military testing and tactics. Versailles only allowed the German military to fulfill a glorified national police force's role, and little else. Nevertheless, the German military would rapidly evolve during the 1920s, in spite of these restrictions. One man in particular played a central role in shaping the Weimer Republic's armed forces into the mold future expansion built upon; General Hans Von Seekt. Seekt was born to be a soldier. His military training started at an early age; his father had served as a general in the Prussian army. Seekt would devote his life to the military and both his academic and practical education would provide him the framework for building and training Germany's armed forces; a framework he creatively designed to circumvent Versailles limitations. Doctrine, organization, and training all garnered the lion's share of Seekt's attentions when he set about working around Versailles. In examining Seekt's accomplishments, we will first explore the doctrines Seekt chose to emphasize in rebuilding the German military, and from where Seekt's theories on warfare developed. Second, with the German military's doctrinal base established, we will then turn to the training and organization chosen by Seekt for turning doctrine into practice before finishing the chapter by examining how the German military establishment chose to integrate the most innovative technologies from the First World War into its evolving war machine. 1 |2 |3 |4 Next Page |
The Globe At War |
The Decades between the World Wars: How Germany Created a Dominant Army from the Ashes of Overwhelming Defeat - Part One |
By Steven D. Mercatante [1] Introduction During the Second World War's first three years, Germany regularly defeated the most powerful military establishments on the planet; victories that placed Germany in position to dominate Europe. Conventional wisdom posits the overwhelming successes won by Germany's armed forces stemmed from a method of war fighting developed in the 1930s by Hitler and his generals; a set of tactics named "Blitzkrieg Warfare." Nonetheless, this belief, and what is widely known regarding how Nazi Germany built its army is patently wrong. This article is the first in a two part series examining why the conventional wisdom misses the mark in explaining how Germany built a potent army prior to beginning the Second World War. Although most studies into Germany's Second World War era armed forces focus on events occurring in the 1930s this study turns the clock back further. Well before Adolf Hitler took power in Germany, the framework had already been laid for Germany's Second World War era military successes, and weaknesses. In exploring how the German army rebuilt after the First World War this article will first explain the role played by military tradition and the German General Staff in the German military establishment. Second, the article will cover the basis for German war fighting doctrines. Finally, I will conclude by demonstrating how these doctrines dictated both the training programs and organization chosen for the German army. The Framework for Nazi Germany's Military Machine: Strategy, Tradition, Doctrine, Training, and Organization The million man German army that rolled across Poland's borders on September 1st, 1939 had developed following the First World War from the 100,000-man cadre permitted by The Treaty of Versailles. These men formed the backbone for what became the World's finest air force (Luftwaffe) and army (Heer) in 1939, coupled to a noticeably weaker but still dangerous navy (Kreigsmarine), which in combination formed the German armed forces (Wermacht), that later wreaked havoc across Europe. Nevertheless, how did 1939 Germany accrue such military advantage from the German state's weak position in Europe? The 1939 German military machine emerged from a long developmental history, predating by centuries the National Socialist regime and the Weimer Republic of the 1920s. There is no question the opportunity arose for German military planners to create a dominant military machine within the brief time following Hitler's ascension to power primarily because of decisions made by interwar era German military reformers. However, it was what German military reformers sought to accomplish which proved crucial. What they sought was simple; to re-establish a German military tradition they believed had been marginalized during the First World War yet offered the best chance for the German state to break free from its historical geo-strategic constraints. The choices made by Germany's military leadership following the end of the First World War thus built upon important and long-standing historical precedent.[2] During the early part of the 20th century, total warfare theory, a theory holding forth war meant mobilizing one's own nation state to fight against the opposing nation state in its entirety, a theory prevalent in countries other than just Germany, played a primary role in the German military's conceptual framework for war fighting. However, superceding the concept of total war was another much older theory within which the German military establishment sought to successfully wage war and had long formed the intellectual base for Prussian military leaders and then the Prussian/German General Staff's strategic and operational goals as it grappled with the problems presented by warfare against multiple nation states. It was a simple theory; seek victory over one enemy at a time via an annihilating first strike. This theory had stemmed from the battlefield exploits and peacetime efforts of 17th, 18th, and 19th century Prussian leaders, including most prominently Frederick William (The Great Elector), Frederick the Great; as well as the efforts of Prussian military leaders and thinkers - including Karl Maria von Clausewitz, August Neidhardt von Gneisenau, Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, and Imperial Germany's long serving Chief of the General Staff at the turn of the 20th century; Alfred Graf von Schlieffen.[3] |
Alfred Graf von Schliefen (1833-1913) - Picture in Public Domain |