SGermany'sWarMachinePageFour

1 |2 |3 |4

Return to Articles Page

Endnotes:

1. Steven Douglas Mercatante has recently completed a manuscript exploring both why
Germany came far closer to winning the Second World War in Europe than previously
thought and also why Germany suffered catastrophic defeat; a manuscript stemming from
over two decades researching and studying the Second World War. Marcel Stein's work
served as an invaluable secondary source for Steven's manuscript. Steven's writing in the
historical field also draws upon his experience as a former history teacher, from his
undergraduate studies in history at the University of Michigan and his graduate work in
history at Eastern Michigan University. Steven is also a practicing attorney and a published
author in the legal field; combining his interests in writing and history for an article entitled
The Deregulation of Usury Ceilings, Rise of Easy Credit, and Increasing Consumer Debt,
published in volume 53 of the South Dakota Law Review.

2. See Robert M. Citino, Death of the Wermacht, The German Campaigns of 1942,
(University Press of Kansas, 2007).

3. Robert M. Citino, Death of the Wermacht, The German Campaigns of 1942, (University
Press of Kansas, 2007) at pp. 3-5. See also Christopher Clark, Iron Kingdom, The Rise and
Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947, (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006).

4. Robert M. Citino, Death of the Wermacht, The German Campaigns of 1942, (University
Press of Kansas, 2007) at page 4.

5. The great military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, in writings published after his death,
had, in the 19th century, finally codified this tradition.

5a. Robert M. Citino, The German Way of War, From the Thirty Years' War to the Third
Reich, (University Press of Kansas, 2005) at page 82.

5b. Robert M. Citino, The German Way of War, From the Thirty Years' War to the Third
Reich, (University Press of Kansas, 2005) at pp. 83-90.

6. To advance total war theories that sought to force brief wars of annihilation, although
each man approached this process differently.

7. The German General Staff on the First World War's eve included 300 officers in
twenty-one branches. In 1824, the German General Staff employed only 29 officers in
three sections. See Geoffrey P. Megargee, Inside Hitler's High Command, (University Press
of Kansas, 2000) at page 2.

8. Geoffrey P. Megargee, Inside Hitler's High Command, (University Press of Kansas, 2000)
at page 2.

9. Ed. By Hannes Heer, Klaus Naumann, War of Extermination The German Military in World
War II, 1941-1944, (Berghahn Books, 2000) at page 24.

10. Id. at 25-27.

11. He had replaced Moltke the younger in September 1914 after Moltke's initial blow had
failed, even though it came within a hairbreadth of winning the war in Western Europe. See
Robert M. Citino, Death of the Wermacht, The German Campaigns of 1942, (University
Press of Kansas, 2007) at page 7.

12. James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, Hans von Seekt and German Military Reform,
(University Press of Kansas, 1992) at pp. 4-5. Verdun stands out in particular because
other than Verdun the German army during the First World War enjoyed considerable
advantages in kill ratio, at nearly 2:1, and prisoner of war ratio's, at nearly 3:1, over her
more numerous foes. See James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, Hans von Seekt and
German Military Reform, (University Press of Kansas, 1992) at page 13. In spite of this
failure, later, during World War II, nations such as Nazi Germany, The Soviet Union, and
Britain - via the RAF's Bomber Command - easily made the short jump from attempting to
annihilate smaller combatant populations to annihilating larger non-combatant populations;
in order to shatter the enemy's society.

13. Geoffrey P. Megargee, Inside Hitler's High Command, (University Press of Kansas,
2000) at page 3.

14. Ed. By Hannes Heer, Klaus Naumann, War of Extermination The German Military in
World War II, 1941-1944, (Berghahn Books, 2000) at page 28.

15. Richard Overy, The Dictators Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia, (W.W. Norton &
Company, 2004) at pp. 447-448.

16. James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, Hans von Seekt and German Military Reform,
(University Press of Kansas, 1992) at pp. 3-5.

17. Eleanor Hancock, The National Socialist Leadership and Total War, 1941-45, (St.
Martin's Press, 1991) at page 8.

18. Richard Overy, The Dictators Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia, (W.W. Norton &
Company, 2004) at page 443.

19. Id. at 449-450.

20. Id. at 441.

21. Id. at 458.

22. Robert M. Citino, Death of the Wermacht, The German Campaigns of 1942, (University
Press of Kansas, 2007) at page 7.

23. Roger J. Spiller Ed. Combined Arms in Battle Since 1939, (U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College Press Fort Leavenworth Kansas, 1992) at page 91.

24. Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader, (De Capo Press, 1996) at pp. 454-455.

25. Robert M. Citino, Death of the Wermacht, The German Campaigns of 1942, (University
Press of Kansas, 2007) at pp. 3-5.

26. Moltke and the German Military Tradition: This Theories and Legacies, Antulio J.
Echevarria II, Parameters, (US Army War College Quarterly, Spring 1996).

27. Ed. Robert Cowley, No End Save Victory, Perspectives on World War II, Essays by
Stephen E. Ambrose, Caleb Carr, John Keegan, William Manchester, and others, (G.P.
Putnam's Sons, 2001) at page 7. Geoffrey P. Megargee, Inside Hitler's High Command,
(University Press of Kansas, 2000) at page 2.

28. Roman Johann Jarymowycz, Tank Tactics From Normandy to Lorraine, (Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2001) at page 10.

29. Moltke and the German Military Tradition: This Theories and Legacies, Antulio J.
Echevarria II, Parameters, (US Army War College Quarterly, Spring 1996). For example,
Schlieffen, Seekt and those that followed built on Field Marshall Moltke's work, and those
that preceded Moltke, in emphasizing the doctrine Moltke codified seeking to establish and
preserve a flexible and responsive command.

30. Auftragstaktik, or Directive Control, in Joint and Combined Operations, by David M.
Keithly and Stephen P. Ferris, Parameters (US Army War College Quarterly, Autumn 1999).
Geoffrey P. Megargee, Inside Hitler's High Command, (University Press of Kansas, 2000) at
page 2.

31. Geoffrey P. Megargee, Inside Hitler's High Command, (University Press of Kansas,
2000) at page 8.

32. Id. at 9.

33. Karl H. Theille, Beyond Monsters and Clowns The Combat SS De-Mythologizing Five
Decades of German Elite Formations, (University Press of America, Inc., 1997) at page 95.

34. Robert M. Citino, Death of the Wermacht, The German Campaigns of 1942, (University
Press of Kansas, 2007) at page 319.

35. Efforts only resurrected late in the Twentieth Century, far after the US Army's
exposure to Auftragstaktik in the years prior to the Second World War.

36. Robert M. Citino, The Path to Blitzkrieg Doctrine and Training in the German Army,
1920-1939, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999) at pp. 16, 43 and 232-233. Standing Fast:
German Defensive Doctrine on the Russian Front During World War II Prewar to March
1943, by Timothy A. Wray, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Combat Studies
Institute; no. 5, September 1986. found at
http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/wray/wray.asp at page 33. This tradition of
operational and tactical flexibility extended deep into the German military past - during
even Moltke's 19th Century era warfare had already become incredibly complex, involving
ever-larger groupings of men, fighting over increasingly spread out distances, and further
divorced from senior commanders.

37. Geoffrey P. Megargee, Inside Hitler's High Command, (University Press of Kansas,
2000) at pp. 8-9.

38. Robert M. Citino, Death of the Wermacht, The German Campaigns of 1942, (University
Press of Kansas, 2007) at page 4.

39. Id. at 16.

40. Richard Vinen, A History in Fragments, Europe in the Twentieth Century, (De Capo
Press, 2000) at page 57.

41. Peter McCarthy & Mike Syron, Panzerkrieg, The Rise and Fall of Hitler's Tank Divisions,
(Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2002) at page 14.

42. James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, Hans von Seekt and German Military Reform,
(University Press of Kansas, 1992) at page 40.

43. B.H. Liddell Hart, The German Generals Talk, (William & Morrow Co., 1948) at pp.
10-12. See also Robert M. Citino, Death of the Wermacht, The German Campaigns of
1942, (University Press of Kansas, 2007) at page 255.

44. The term "Blitzkrieg" never was a part of German military doctrine. It was used by
various militaries in writings during the 1930's. See Robert M. Citino, Death of the
Wermacht, The German Campaigns of 1942, (University Press of Kansas, 2007) at page
15. Although some argue a writer for Time Magazine coined the term on September 28,
1939 in describing Germany's speedy victory in Poland. See Karl H. Theille, Beyond
Monsters and Clowns The Combat SS De-Mythologizing Five Decades of German Elite
Formations, (University Press of America, Inc., 1997) at page 21.

45. James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, Hans von Seekt and German Military Reform,
(University Press of Kansas, 1992) at pp. 6-8.

46. Geoffrey P. Megargee, Inside Hitler's High Command, (University Press of Kansas,
2000) at pp. 10-11. See also Robert L. DinNardo, Germany and the Axis Powers, From
Coalition to Collapse, (University Press of Kansas, 2005).

47. Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine on the Russian Front During World War II
Prewar to March 1943, by Timothy A. Wray, U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College. Combat Studies Institute; no. 5, September 1986. found at
http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/wray/wray.asp at pp. 10-11.

48. Id. at 5.

49. James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, Hans von Seekt and German Military Reform,
(University Press of Kansas, 1992) at page 9.

50. Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine on the Russian Front During World War II
Prewar to March 1943, by Timothy A. Wray, U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College. Combat Studies Institute; no. 5, September 1986. found at
http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/wray/wray.asp at pp. 5-6.

51. Id. at 6-7.

52. Id. at 6-8, 11.

53. Robert M. Citino, The Path to Blitzkrieg Doctrine and Training in the German Army,
1920-1939, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999) at page 35.

54. Wolfram Wette, The Wermacht, History, Myth, Reality, (Harvard University Press,
2006) at page 158.

55. James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, Hans von Seekt and German Military Reform,
(University Press of Kansas, 1992) at page 47.

56. Id. at 70-77.

57. B.H. Liddell Hart, The German Generals Talk, (William & Morrow Co., 1948) at page 15.

58. Id. at 16.

59. Richard Vinen, A History in Fragments, Europe in the Twentieth Century, (De Capo
Press, 2000) at page 177.

60. Samuel W. Mitcham, Jr. The Panzer Legions A Guide to the German Army Tank
Divisions of World War II and Their Commanders, (Greenwood Press, 2001) at page 4.

61. Von Seekt exercised his creative talents to the utmost in arriving at unique ways to
train his army within Versailles constraints. For example when training his army to use
armored vehicles, prohibited under Versailles, Von Seekt simulated tanks by covering cars
with canvas, or cardboard or thin armor. Artillery, also not permitted, was created in
wooden models except for the most important parts for training, which were made of
metal, such as the breech to practice the crucial skill of loading the weapon. See B.H.
Liddell Hart, The German Generals Talk, (William & Morrow Co., 1948) at page 16.

62. Auftragstaktik, or Directive Control, in Joint and Combined Operations, by David M.
Keithly and Stephen P. Ferris, Parameters (US Army War College Quarterly, Autumn 1999).

63. James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, Hans von Seekt and German Military Reform,
(University Press of Kansas, 1992) at pp. 80-96.

64. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Ed. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Knofp, 1993) at
pp. 3-19.

65. James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, Hans von Seekt and German Military Reform,
(University Press of Kansas, 1992) at page 205.

66. Robert M. Citino, The Path to Blitzkrieg Doctrine and Training in the German Army,
1920-1939, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999) at pp. 24-25.

67. James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, Hans von Seekt and German Military Reform,
(University Press of Kansas, 1992) at page 44.

68. Robert M. Citino, The Path to Blitzkrieg Doctrine and Training in the German Army,
1920-1939, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999) at page 25.

69. Id. at 16-18.

70. James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, Hans von Seekt and German Military Reform,
(University Press of Kansas, 1992) at page 18-19.