SBattleforAtlanticCaseStudyPageSeven

Applying lessons learned from the Battle of the Atlantic to the USN today

The German U-boat fleet proved incapable of winning the naval war in the Atlantic,
although at immense cost to the Allied war effort. German mistakes mitigated the cost to
the Allies, but so did Allied economic power, ingenuity, and a tremendous and coordinated
Allied coalitional effort.

Unlike the days prior to the Second World War today though the United States Navy is not
just preparing for the next blue water battle involving scores of aircraft, missiles, and
carrier fleets, but also, if the QDR and subsequent US Naval pronouncements are any true
indication, actively observing and responding to growing trends regarding asymmetric
threats. In particular, the USN is purportedly focusing on threats from China which the QDR
regards as possessing "the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States
and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military
advantages."[87]

In assessing America's preparation to deal with future asymmetric threats it is more
important to follow the money rather than the rhetoric. If one follows the money allocated
for defense spending, the impact the QDR had made in preparing the US Navy for the
varied threats she is likely to face becomes much less clear.

For example, in perhaps the most far-reaching indication of US naval spending priorities,
the USN is planning on building an entirely new class of super carriers even though the
current carrier fleet has no peer in the world. The first in the proposed Gerald R. Ford class
of 100,000-ton nuclear powered aircraft carriers is scheduled for completion in 2015 with
more to follow as needed at a staggering $8 billion per ship.[88] Of course, to protect the
highly vulnerable aircraft carriers the Navy in particular wants new cruisers and destroyers.
Consequently, in 2006 the USN planned to build two new and physically large DDG-1000
Zumwalt destroyers at a cost of well over 3 billion dollars apiece, the equivalent of far
greater numbers of attack submarines, or roughly 17 smaller littoral combat vessels for use
in coastal operations. The USN meanwhile only planned to build 50 littoral vessels, since
the bulk of procurement funds would be sunk into the traditional blue water surface
fleet.[89] Moreover, since 2006, little has changed.

The Fiscal 2008 plan submitted in 2007 by the Secretary of the Navy to Congress also
sought to increase the numbers of destroyers, but only added five more littoral vessels to
the 2006 plan's 50 such vessels. In addition, the DDG-1000 Zumwalt class destroyers
envisioned by the Navy are nearly the size of today's cruisers and a third heavier than the
still potent Aegis equipped DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class destroyers they are meant to
replace. Although the Navy reduced its planned DDG-1000 class destroyer order first to
five,[90]and now to two; the reduction in expense is not nearly enough - given two
DDG-1000 class destroyers will cost billions - and in addition has not lead to plans for
weapons systems that are more useful for combating today's threats.

In another instance of the misguided spending priorities of today's USN one only has to
look at the new cruiser classes requested by the Navy. The Navy plans to build a CGN(X)
Class Cruiser to defend against ballistic missiles. Although the Navy needs to combat the
threat from tactical ballistic missiles, these ships are not only expensive, at five to seven
billion dollars each, but have also reached the unwieldy size of battle cruisers from the
Second World War with each CGN(X) class ship weighing approximately 24,000 tons.[91]

Finally, in addition to building brand new carrier battle groups, even though the existing
carrier battle groups have never been used for their intended purpose and largely serve as
grotesquely expensive floating airfields to support ground-based operations[92]

Certainly there are better options to consider that would not only allow the Navy to flexibly
face down blue water threats but build the number of ships necessary to face the myriad
threats in all waters, especially the coastal threats the Navy remains particularly
vulnerable against.[91] the U.S. Navy insists upon building ever larger and more complex
amphibious assault ships. The new LHA-6 class amphibious assault ships, capable of
carrying the problematic MV-22 Osprey tilt rotor aircraft and STOVL (short take off and
vertical landing) F-35B Lightning II Strike fighter will replace the existing Tarawa
class.[93]The new amphibious assault ships are in construction even though the U.S.
military has not conducted a true amphibious assault against a prepared enemy defensive
position since Inchon during the Korean War more than a half century ago. Between the
new amphibious assault ships, super carriers, destroyers and cruisers certainly there are
better options to consider that would not only allow the Navy to flexibly face down blue
water threats but build the number of ships necessary to face the myriad threats in all
waters, especially the coastal threats the Navy remains particularly vulnerable against.[94]

A glaring example of how vulnerable the USN remains to threats in littoral waters came
early in January 2008, when, in an incident heavily debated as to the facts and context
surrounding it, several small Iranian patrol boats approached three much larger US warships
near the Straights of Hormuz. Although, the incident did not lead to an exchange of fire, it
was a reminder of the asymmetric threats confronting today's USN in waters across the
globe.

Such threats have proven so pressing, the Navy chose to war game them in August 2002;
to disastrous results for the Navy's blue water fleet. In that war game, multiple, small, fast
maneuvering speedboats in the Persian Gulf used swarming tactics to decimate a fleet
comprised of large US warships. In the game, the US war fleet lost 16 warships, including
an aircraft carrier, in as little as ten minutes to the swarming speedboat fleet commanded
by retired Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Paul K. Van Riper.[95] Using speedboats armed with
machine guns and rockets; including some boats used as suicide boats packed with
explosives, to explode at the waterline of the big American ships, and supported by land
and air launched anti-ship/cruise missiles General Riper devastated a large US naval task
force. The referees restarted the game after the US fleet was sunk, and in the second
iteration of the game the US Navy won.

However, the lessons were not lost on the Navy, and, unfortunately, observers from
around the globe. Despite acknowledging these lessons, on January 11, 2008 the chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen restated the Navy's tardiness in addressing
such issues when he pointed out the Navy continues to build massive weapons systems
hard pressed to handle an enemy using cheap but sophisticated asymmetric tactics.[96]
Meanwhile, China is not only building the same type of small, heavily armed, fast patrol
boats used by Iran, but many believe China is selling them to Iran, with the boats used in
that incident similar to those built in China.[97]

The Navy is not alone in seeking to build Cold War era and potentially irrelevant weapons
systems, other service branches are also making questionable procurement decisions. For
instance, Ballistic Missile defense, or "Star Wars", F/A-22 fighters, Future Combat Systems,
and V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft all remain in the military budget at the expense of
weapons systems much more appropriate for dealing with global terrorism or the threat
represented by China's growing power projection capabilities.

China is actively developing capabilities in tactical ballistic missiles, anti-ship missiles -
including cruise missiles and nuclear capable anti-shipping missiles, advanced submarines,
naval mines, advanced 100 plus knot supercavitation torpedoes, amphibious capabilities
and other important weapons systems for shielding an attack on Taiwan as well as
projecting power throughout Asia and into the Pacific.[98] In comparison to the USN's new
blue water ships, these weapons are cheap, flexible and incredibly cost effective. Although
the QDR and subsequent planning documents call for deploying half the Navy's carriers and
nearly two thirds its submarines to the Pacific; whether the carrier fleets can operate in
waters literally covered by hundreds of missiles and whether the few attack submarines on
patrol in the Pacific can actively track China's burgeoning submarine fleet are both dubious
propositions.

The Chinese focus on missile technology and her submarine fleet are powerful examples of
advanced asymmetric capabilities capable of dealing with the USN's carrier fleets; carrier
fleets currently without peer in the world. The Chinese submarine fleet in particular offers
an interesting parallel to the threat represented by Germany in the Atlantic over sixty
years ago. Some experts hold China's submarine fleet could dwarf the USN's diminishing
attack fleet within as little as twenty years.[99] In addition to purchases of Russian built
boats, China has substantially raised domestic submarine output even as she accelerates
development of advanced models capable of avoiding most detection capabilities now
possessed by the USN. When equipped with new Russian torpedoes and anti-ship missiles
the new Chinese submarines will pose a substantial threat to the USN's Pacific fleet.[100]

Even though the USN and Defense Department are paying lip service to the threat
represented by China's growing submarine fleet, much like their predecessors early in the
1940s little is being done to counter this threat as the USN's submarine fleet rapidly
diminishes.[101] On one hand, the US military is actively reintegrating her defense efforts
in conjunction with Japan; nonetheless, the USN had quite a bit of work ahead if it is to
retain primacy in the Pacific.[102] For example, in a humiliating, for the USN, display of
what China's submarines fleet is capable of, recently a Chinese Song class diesel
submarines surfaced within five miles of the USS Kitty Hawk, an aircraft carrier arguably
protected by the US Navy's most advanced ASW assets.[103] An incident such as this
demonstrates there is little question the Chinese will approach challenging the
preponderant military strength of America in the Pacific asymmetrically, as did Germany in
World War II in the Atlantic, and there is little question US naval planners need to do more
than at least recognize this threat. Nevertheless, much like the issues confronting Admiral
King in 1941-42 serious questions remain regarding our commitment to preparing for the
obvious threat.

Most perplexingly, unlike the much more potent threats faced by Admiral King in 1941-42,
when the USN faced the world's largest carrier fleet in the Pacific and the most proficient
submarine fleet in the world in the Atlantic, the threats facing the USN and American
protected trade today are largely asymmetric in nature. These threats are either on the
high-end - China or the low end - terrorism and piracy; either way they require flexibility
and speed in response if the today's USN is to effectively meet and deter such threats.

Although there is little question China ultimately seeks to extend its power deep into the
Pacific, that day should be long in coming; given the preponderant power represented by
the USN's massive carrier fleet in the open ocean. In the short term, China will instead
develop an advanced asymmetric threat capable of keeping the USN's carrier fleets' at
bay.[104] As such, a littoral capability deploying more numerous smaller, faster, more
flexible vessels as well as assets better predisposed to dealing with China's large and
growing diesel-electric boat fleet offers the USN substantial benefits for countering China.
Additionally a littoral fleet, buttressed by adequate numbers of frigates, attack submarines,
and other versatile craft better allows for meeting the threat posed to the United States
by global terrorism - an enemy lending itself well to an unconventional response from an at
times all too conventional American military apparatus deeply wedded to technological
answers for tactical problems.[105]

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