SBattleforAtlanticCaseStudyPageFive

During the first half of 1942 at most one dozen U-boats operated at any one time off the
US East Coast, but these few U-boats proved highly effective. Of 106 operational U-boats
in February 1942, only 9 were on station off the American coast, with 12 en route and 9
returning.[46] Regardless, in just May and June 1942 the Allies lost over one million tons of
shipping in American waters, or half of what the Allies lost in all of 1941.[47]

Doenitz knew Germany's victory could have been much greater, perhaps even decisive, and
he wrote in frustration "These fine gentlemen think only of victory on land. They've
forgotten the essential principle of the art of war: Be as strong s possible at the critical
spot." Thus, even as the dramatic successes off the American coast bore considerable
fruit - as late as April 1942, 39 U-boats meandered about the Mediterranean Sea and
Arctic Ocean, accomplishing virtually nothing.[48] The poor U-boat deployment provided
the Americans an opportunity to adapt rather than face defeat. A defeat entirely deserved
due to the negligent approach taken by the highest ranks of the United States Naval
command toward preparing for a U-boat threat having formed the cornerstone of German
naval policy for over two years.

The USAAF and USN's failures to pool their efforts in preparing for war among other things
mirrored the mistakes made by the Kreigsmarine and Luftwaffe. The American military
bumbled along taking an inordinate amount of time to organize protection for the vulnerable
and disappearing shipping off her coast. The US Navy actually possessed available
resources but the destroyer deployments - the best ships for combating U-boats- was
deplorable. The USN stationed nearly half the 73 destroyers deployed by the US Atlantic
Fleet far out to sea, where few German U-boats hunted. American destroyers literally
sailed right past the carnage off the American coast, to fruitlessly track back and forth
across the open ocean.[49] The Army finally provided nearly 100 medium bombers for ASW
duty and eventually increasing numbers of bombers began driving the German U-boats from
the Mid-Atlantic portion of the US East Coast.[50] By the spring of 1942 the USN finally
put a convoy system in place bringing security to the incredibly dangerous waters off the
US East Coast.[51]

In response, Doenitz flexibly directed his U-boats to the Caribbean where the destruction
of Allied merchant shipping continued unabated. With U-boat supply tankers in place,
German U-boats refueled and resumed operations further south and west in the Caribbean
where ASW protection for merchant ships lagged newly established US efforts to the east
and north. In May alone U-boats sank 115 merchant ships off the American coast with
more than half sunk in the Gulf of Mexico. This distressing figure rose to 122 ships lost in
June. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall wrote to King on June 19;

"The losses by submarines off our Atlantic seaboard and in the Caribbean now threaten our
entire war effort. The following statistics bearing on the subject have been brought to my
attention: Of the 74 ships allocated to the Army for July by the War Shipping
Administration, 17 have already been sunk….I am fearful that another month or two of this
will so cripple our means of transport that we will be unable to bring sufficient men and
planes to bear against the enemy in critical theatres to exercise a determining influence on
the war."[52]

The sinkings were so numerous and the Americans so unprepared Admiral King asked the
British for as many as twenty corvettes to protect his newly formed convoys in the
Caribbean, a number the British understandably balked at given the threat of U-boat
depredations in the mid Atlantic.[53] In desperation, civilian boats and crews bravely
formed volunteer combat patrols to assist the overburdened and under equipped US Coast
Guard carrying the brunt of American efforts. US tanker losses to U-boats reached
staggering levels, the American oil industry frantically lobbied the Administration and Navy
for better protection, otherwise the oil industry ominously reported it would lose a third of
all tankers within the year.[54]

By the end of 1942, Germany had enjoyed a banner year in the Battle of the Atlantic. The
Germans sank over 1,000 merchantmen against the loss of only 106 German and Italian
submarines across a massive battlefield stretching from the Arctic Sea to the tropical
Atlantic seas off the South American and African coasts. Total Allied shipping losses to
submarines in the Atlantic stood at 5.7 million tons of shipping, from 8.33 million tons lost
worldwide. With only 7 million tons of merchant shipping produced in Allied shipyards in
1942, Germany, statistically speaking, was winning the war at sea.[55] German U-boat
production had finally increased to one per day, and by the middle of 1942 an average of
75 U-boats roamed on station in the Atlantic. Furthermore, American ASW efforts proved
dismal with only 16 U-boats sunk by the Americans during the entire year. Meanwhile,
U-boats sent some 397 ships to the bottom in US protected waters. Overall, the German
shipyards produced 121 U-boats during the last half of 1942 while only losing 58. The
favorable German U-boat production to loss numbers meant Doenitz had 212 operational
U-boats in service at the year's end, or over twice as many as in January 1942. British
shipping suffered miserably, and the British merchant fleet reached its highest state of
crisis in the War.[56] Germany seemed to be winning the fight at sea, and with it the War
against the Anglo-American alliance.

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