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The Globe At War |
This Month in History: February 1943 |
February 1943 - Kasserine Pass The Battle for Kasserine Pass represents one of the worst American military performances in the twentieth century. That said, as bad as the Battle for Kasserine Pass went it could have been a lot worse. Instead, and saving the Allies from a more significant defeat, the Germans undermined their own chances to create a significant operational and even strategic level success because, as was all too common during the Second World War, they failed to create a unified command with clearly defined and agreed upon objectives. In this instance part of the problem was that German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and General Hans von Arnim held a deep-seated animosity toward each other. Most critically, during the planning for the February 1943 German counteroffensive in North Africa they failed to come to agreement on even basic aspects undergirding the plan. Tactical and operational level German command mistakes would cause the Axis to miss out on a golden opportunity to deal the Allied armies in Tunisia a sharp and potentially severe blow. Field Marshal Albert Kesselring brought the two officers together on February 9, 1943 and together the three hammered out a plan for attacking the Allied forces that had landed in Algeria and Morocco during November of 1942 and then driven east into Tunisia. The plans called for Arnim to attack into western Tunisia with the 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions, earlier loaned to him by Rommel, and penetrate the Faid Pass as part of a northern axis of advance. Rommel's spearhead, led by a battle group from Afrika Corps, would advance from the south to take Gafsa. Units from Arnim's command, turned over to Rommel once Arnim had accomplished his immediate goals, would then supplement Rommel's force and a drive deep behind allied lines. It was from this prism which Rommel viewed the counteroffensive - as a chance to advance deep into the Allied rear in central Tunisia. There was little doubt the Allied army had overextended itself when it pushed into northeast Tunisia. Thus, Rommel sought to take advantage of the spread out Allied armies and hamstring them logistically, as well as improving the Axis army's own shaky logistical standing, by seizing the huge allied supply dumps at Tebessa. From Tebessa the German army would be in position, at only 100 miles from the coast, to threaten the entire Allied armies with encirclement by driving north to the coast; forcing the allies to withdraw or face annihilation. Then Rommel could pivot to the east and with the strength of the combined German armies turn on Montgomery, where he sat before the Mareth line in southern Tunisia. Arnim however remained fearful of such a bold plan and sought a more limited attack. The failure to iron out the differences between these two commanders later worked against the German attempt to achieve a decisive victory. Opposing Arnim and Rommel was American General Fredendall, commanding the American II Corps. Fredendall was the perfect opponent for Rommel as Fredendall was anything but an aggressive leader who had woefully deployed his troops in isolated outposts on the heights of key passes but with almost no concentrated reserves ready to react to an immediate threat on short notice. Fredendall's main force, the US 1st Armored Division's Combat Command A and Combat Command C sat isolated in the German path. Combat Command A loosely defended the Faid Pass and the important Sidi-Bou-Zid Road - the primary communications artery running through the region. Fredendall split CCA between widely separated djebels (hills) bracketing the Sidi-Bou-Zid Road, placing only one tank battalion and a reconnaissance battalion in reserve to the rear. With mutual support for the defensive positions almost non-existent the Germans had the chance to isolate and defeat the Americans in detail. That is not to say an American combat command was anything to sneeze at; it roughly equaled a brigade in size (CCA represented one-third the 1st Armored Division's striking power). In some respects similar to a German kampfgruppe, the American combat command was nonetheless a more limited formation as it was formed from a single armored division; it soon proved not as flexible as the German combined arms teams which were often more informally created and tailored to specific missions. If the Germans destroyed the American positions near Faid, German forces would be in position to take the key road junction at Sbeitla; 35 miles to Faid's west. The two roads running west and north from Sbeitla offered Rommel a chance to penetrate the formidable Western Dorsal Mountains in central Tunisia and would allow for a quick push on Kasserine and then Tebessa to the west, or support a move north to Sbiba. Such a maneuver would force the Allies to attempt to defend in two directions, and thus would allow Rommel the freedom to choose where to concentrate for the decisive blow. Rommel wanted the 10th Panzer Division and a detachment of Tiger tanks to reinforce his units for the primary push. Arnim refused however, and Rommel made do with a second small force that he ordered to take Gafsa, far to Arnim's southwest. Next Page Return to This Month in History Main Page |