BattleMapOverlordJune61944GermanDispositions

Initially Germany approached the problems inherent in defending
occupied France as largely one of preventing special operations
conducted by the British. Such a German approach was
understandable given Britain's best units remained tied down in North
Africa during 1941-43. Nonetheless, Hitler's declaration of war on the
United States, coupled with Barbarossa's defeat and the Soviet
Union's resilience meant it was only a matter of time before the
Anglo-American armies struck Nazi occupied Western Europe.
To direct the German defensive effort in the west, Hitler turned, in
the spring of 1942, to Field Marshall Gerd von Rundstedt; idled since
his November 1941 resignation as commander of Army Group South on
Germany's Eastern Front. Rundstedt took over a command in France
plagued by numerous problems. Most noticeably, the German
leadership featured an all too common top-level dichotomy. This
schism eventually fed the 1944 German debate regarding the
appropriate strategy for dealing with an allied invasion; a rupture
never truly resolved, with the resultant half-measures crippling
German defensive efforts.

After taking over the German army's in France Rundstedt in particular
became tremendously concerned about the pitiable state of his
"army." Rundstedt's concern in regards to his command resulted in an
October 1943 inspection report which he sent to Hitler. Rundstedt's
report requested greater authority over military assets in the region,
as well as detailing a woeful shortage in fuel, heavy weapons,
ammunition, and quality personnel. In addition, Rundstedt's report also
and perhaps most critically narrowed the expected Allied invasion sites
to three possible areas. The expectations created by this assessment
would have profound implications for the disposition of the German
armies in France during the spring of 1944. What the report did was
single out the Pas de Calais area as the foremost location to expect
an allied invasion - a logical choice given the region's proximity to
England. However, the report also highlighted potential landing sites
along the French Mediterranean coast in conjunction with potential
attacks in the Bay of Biscay - a vast region stretching all the way to
the Spanish border. Lastly, Rundstedt singled out the beaches in
Normandy and Brittany as potential Allied invasion sites.

The legacy of these decisions is evident when one examines this map.
In looking at the German dispositions one sees the results of a
command apparatus that never really made up their minds where they
thought the Allies would strike. The Germans never even really
organized their defensive armies around properly defending their top
choices for an expected Allied invasion. Thus, several elements had
worked to undermine the German defensive effort. First, was the
failure to limit the scope of potential invasion sites early in the
process; although this can also be attributed to a brilliant Allied
deception effort in regards to where the invasion force would land.
Second, in November 1943, when Hitler appointed Field Marshall Erwin
Rommel to prepare the "Atlantic Wall" for repulsing the Allied invasion,
in spite of Rundstedt's continued presence, the Germans had only
further disorganized their command. The bifurcated German command
apparatus meant competing theories revolving around how to stop the
Allies were never truly resolved. Up to June 6, 1944 German planners
remained split in regards as to whether they should attempt to smash
the Allies on the beaches or fight the Allies in the French interior.

Consequently, Germany's best defensive assets; including the ten
panzer and panzer grenadier divisions in France on June 6, 1944 are
scattered all about. Had Hitler, OKW, Rundstedt and Rommel ever
resolved their numerous differences and even a third of the
panzer/panzer grenadier divisions in France been concentrated near
the Normandy beaches on June 6 1944 then the D-Day victory
celebrated every June in the sixty-five years since this fateful day
may not have occurred, and the world could look very different today.

Map Courtesy of: Department of History, United States Military
Academy