BWPicM3MediumTankatKasserinePass

The Battle of Kasserine Pass, which began on February 14, 1943, was
one of the worst, if not the worst, tactical level defeat suffered by
American mechanized forces in history. A number of reasons explain
why the Germans handled the Americans so easily.

Perhaps most importantly, German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and, to
a lesser extant, General Hans von Arnim woefully overmatched both
British Lieutenant General Kenneth Anderson, in overall command over
the allied forces in the region, and American Major General Lloyd
Fredendall, commanding the US II Corps. Fredendall, the proximate
figure in the debacle at Kasserine Pass, was anything but a front line
leader. He largely relied on maps to deploy his men, and he rarely left
his command post. For instance, during the winter of 1943 Fredendall
made only one visit to the actual American front line defensive
positions. As a result, Fredendall compounded Anderson's decision to
spread the British First Army, of which US II Corps was a part, far too
thin. Fredendall woefully deployed his troops in isolated outposts on
the heights of several key passes and failed to establish a
concentrated reserve capable of delivering a decisive counter blow
against a potential attacker. Fredendall virtually doomed the 1st
Armored Division in stretching it across nearly 100 miles of real estate
and even then only deploying two thirds of the 1st Armored at that as
Combat Command B had been detached from the 1st Armored and
attached to another corps. Supporting the 1st Armored Division in
defending this vast front stood just one French Division. The 1st
Armored Divisions Combat Command A (CCA) and Combat Command C
(CCC) thus sat isolated in the German path with CCA split between
widely separated djebels (hills). Fredendall held only one tank
battalion and a reconnaissance battalion in reserve. This meant the
Germans could isolate and defeat the Americans in detail, which is
exactly what they did.

A second reason for the 1st Armored Division's defeat was simple
inexperience. American GIs, lacking combat experience, performed
poorly against the veteran German troops. American armored units
deployed in piecemeal and repeated errors made by the British and
French earlier in the war. The American Army Air Force fared miserably
against the Luftwaffe and failed to support the American troops.
Furthermore, American armored and anti-armor doctrine had been
premised on a fatal misunderstanding in regards to German tactics.
American doctrine ascribed to the belief German commanders normally
attacked with fast moving panzers operating en masse. In reality,
German commanders were ardent adherents of combined arms tactics,
thought carefully at the tactical level and almost never acted
recklessly; allowing them to carve up American defensive positions
lacking the depth and mix of arms needed to defeat the Germans. In
addition, when American armor was used to attack it was used almost
as if it were a mechanized version of 19th century cavalry - charging
straight into the German lines without the support of other combat
arms. Thus German panzer divisions, wielding their artillery, anti-tank
weapons, infantry, armor and other supporting units as a coherent
defensive force, easily destroyed brave but foolish allied tank only
counter-attacks.

Finally, some American equipment employed at Kasserine Pass was
anything but up to the standards of the 1943 era battlefield. For
instance, the M3 Lee/Grant medium tank, pictured above, with its high
silhouette evoking the French Char B or Soviet T-35, was a far too
easy target. In addition, the main gun, though a perfectly adequate
75mm gun, was mounted so low on the chassis as to exacerbate the
tank's need to expose itself to enemy fire.

Picture Courtesy of Courtesy of U.S. Army