BWPicGIsTakingCover

For the US Army the fall of 1944 represented one long grinding
struggle along Germany's western border. A struggle highlighting a
surprising manpower shortage within the US Army's frontline rifle
companies at a time when the Third Reich hovered on collapse. This
manpower shortage stemmed from a number of reasons. Perhaps most
prominently was the American method of waging war.

The 1944-45 era US Army deployed an inordinate number of
specialized artillery, tank destroyer, anti-aircraft and other such units.
All of these units required considerable manpower to maintain in the
field and represented a product of General of the US Army George C.
Marshal's earlier decisions to build an army capable of fighting the
1940 era German army and blitz. By 1944 however, the German army
was a mere shadow of its former self and had largely been reduced to
fighting in static defensive positions. Rooting out such defenders
required both manpower and firepower. Yet in the US Army firepower
reigned supreme. Thus, the limited number of rifle companies were
forced to bear the lion's share of the combat burden and absorbed a
huge percentage of both combat and non-combat losses. In addition,
Marshal's decision to limit the US Army's size, meant American infantry
divisions remained permanent fixtures at the front.

As a result, the casualties in the frontline divisions had reached such
severe levels General Omar Bradley spent much of his December 16,
1944 meeting with Dwight Eisenhower addressing the problems
afflicting his 12th Army Group. The 12th Army Group included 31
divisions, out of 43 American divisions deployed everywhere in Europe
in December 1944; meaning Bradley's command ranked as the largest
American Army in U.S. history. In spite of this army's size, nearly all of
its divisions fought under manned by the late fall of 1944. The US
Army in the European Theater of Operations, ETO, was a full 17,000
men under strength in the front line infantry companies alone. More
specifically, in just five weeks fighting, the 12th Army Group lost
64,000 battle casualties and another 12,000 men were lost to trench
foot. The majority of these losses occurred in the First and Ninth
Armies north of the Ardennes. Accordingly, the US First and Ninth
Armies fought under increasing strain as fall turned to winter and their
aggregate 14 under strength divisions lined up across a 55-mile front.
In the Huertgen Forest alone, a series of American infantry divisions
suffered 33,000 casualties in total.

The composition of the average US Infantry Divisions only made the
casualties endured even more prohibitive. Approximately 3,240
riflemen staffed a typical US Infantry Division of 14,000 men. These
3,240 men not only carried the division's combat punch but also
suffered most of the casualties endured by the parent division. Only
14 percent of the US Army's entire strength in Europe served in the
infantry ranks but the infantry suffered 70 percent of the casualties,
the loss rate in infantry platoons averaged 90 percent.

Even Patton's seemingly dominant Third Army staggered across the
German border; a by-product of pushing through stiff German
resistance, particularly along the Moselle River and near Metz. The
Third Army fought nearly 15% under strength in its infantry battalions
in December 1944. Moreover, even though it may not sound
significant that the quarter million man Third Army fought 11,000
riflemen short during November and December 1944; these 11,000
men equaled enough riflemen to fill nearly an entire infantry Corps.
Furthermore, on a sustained basis, i.e. from September 1, 1944 up to
December 16, 1944, the Third Army lost 53,182 men - almost equaling
the losses of First and Ninth Armies combined.

Picture Courtesy of US National Archives (111-SC-197261)